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The Legend of the Justified True Belief
Analysis∗
Julien Dutant
Feb. 5th 2015, forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives
In the last few decades a certain picture of the history of epistemology has
gained wide currency among epistemologists. The Legend, as I will call it, is
summarised in the claim that:
Edmund Gettier’s landmark paper successfully refuted the tradi-
tional analysis of knowledge. (Sosa et al., 2009, 189)
As my label indicates, I think that the Legend is false. Not that Edmund Gettier
did not refute the Justified True Belief analysis of knowledge. He did. But the
analysis was not the traditional one.
Even though the Legend figures in almost every epistemology handbook,
I do not expect a strong resistance to the claim that it is false. The Legend is
not widespread because it has been powerfully defended—it has hardly been
defended at all—but because no better picture is available.1 Such a picture is
precisely what this paper intends to offer. Call it the New Story.
Like the Legend, the New Story is painted in broad strokes. It ignores a lot
of historical detail and involves a significant amount of rational reconstruction.
Yet I think it offers a recognisable portrait of the history of epistemology and
provides an illuminating perspective on the present of the discipline.
The New Story goes as follows. There is a traditional conception of knowl-
edge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the
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traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible
mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only
true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it,
that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if
it has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to
be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism.2
Classical Infallibilism is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier at-
tacked. In Gettier’s cases what is discernible to the subject is compatible with
error. So Classical Infallibilists do not have trouble classifying them as cases in
which one does not know. Their problem is rather to classify anything we seem
to know as knowledge, for few of our beliefs seem to bear discernible marks
of truth. That constrats vividly with the view Gettier attacked, which had no
sceptical implications but ran into Gettier-style counterexamples.
Classical Infallibilism is manifest in Descartes’s epistemology and the Hel-
lenistic debate on criteria of truth. There is evidence of it in the writings of
many others. More importantly, there are few, if any, clear examples of Western
philosophers rejecting it until fairly recently. The New Story’s bold hypothesis
is that Classical Infallibilism was endorsed by virtually all Western philoso-
phers until the mid-twentieth century.
Early on Classical Infallibilists divided into two camps: Dogmatists, who
thought that many of our beliefs bear discernible marks of truth, and Sceptics,
who thought that almost none does. The two were in stalemate for centuries.
In modern times, however, Dogmatism became increasingly untenable. That
revived Probabilist Scepticism, a brand of Scepticism according to which even
though we do not know much, we are justified in believing many things. But
most strikingly, that spurred Idealism, a brand of Dogmatism that hopes to re-
store the idea that our beliefs bear discernible marks of truth by adopting a
revisionary metaphysics.
In mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy Idealism fell apart and Scep-
ticism was barred by common sense philosophy and ordinary language phi-
losophy. Some philosophers eventually rejected Classical Infallibilism itself.
But there were two main ways of doing so. Some rejected the infallibility re-
quirement. Like Probabilistic Sceptics, they held that a mere indication of truth
justifies belief—where a mere indication of truth is a property that somehow
indicates the truth of a belief without entailing it. What they added was that
such an indication, in conjunction with truth, would be sufficient for knowl-
2The idea that traditional conceptions of knowledge are “infallibilist” is not new (see e.g. Lehrer,
1974, 78; Fumerton, 2006, 14–5, 59). What the New Story adds is a more precise treatment of the
relevant notion of infallibility, the idea that Classical Infallibilism does not face the Gettier problem,
and the idea that the two aspects of Classical Infallibilism (discernibility and truth entailment) gave
rise to the contemporary divide between internalism and externalism.
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edge. That is the familiar Justified True Belief analysis that Gettier refuted. That
is also the source of the Internalist views that insist on a discernible condition
on justified belief or knowledge. Others rejected the discernibility requirement
instead. They maintained the idea that knowledge requires a mark of truth but
they did not require it to be discernible. That is the source of Externalist views
in epistemology. The demise of Classical Infallibilism as a theory of knowledge
was quick and complete: once they gave it up analytic epistemologists never
looked back. Nevertheless it seems to linger on in the way some epistemolo-
gists think of evidence.
The New Story is a crude picture, but it makes sense of a range of facts
about the history of Western epistemology: why Gettier problems appeared so
late, why debates over Scepticism were central, why contemporary epistemol-
ogy divides into Externalist and Internalist trends, why it is awkward to locate
historical views in the divide, and more.
An extensive defence of the New Story is beyond my abilities and the scope
of this paper. My aim is rather to set it out as a hypothesis worthy of investiga-
tion. The best way to do this is to make its overall structure clear. I thus state
positions in ideal forms before illustrating them with representative historical
cases. I am well aware that any ascription of an idealised view to any particular
philosopher—not to mention classes of philosophers—is bound to face many
wrinkles that have to be ironed out in some way or other. I will nevertheless
avoid cumbersome hedging and favour simplicity over accuracy. In history as
elsewhere, progress can be achieved through clear and simple models whose
limits are easy to test.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 traces the origins of the Leg-
end and highlights some facts that would be puzzling if it were true. Sec-
tion 2 sets out Classical Infallibilism. Section 3 shows Classical Infallibilism at
work in a central debate in the history of epistemology: that between Stoics
and Academic Sceptics. Section 4 reviews salient evidence for and against the
hypothesis that until 1950 virtually all Western philosophers were Classical In-
fallibilists. Section 5 recounts the fall of Classical Infallibilism and shows how
it illuminates the contemporary landscape. Section 6 draws some lessons and
indicates lines of further research.
It is my hope that this paper will open up history to contemporary epis-
temologists and contemporary epistemology to historians. However, readers
exclusively interested in epistemology may conveniently skip sections 3 and 4
and readers exclusively interested in history may conveniently skip sections 1
and 5.3
3Abbreviations for historical citations. Hellenistic philosophers are cited from Long and Sed-
ley’s (1987) collection (e.g. LS 40H). Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and Kant are cited in the usual
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1 The Legend and its puzzles
The Legend is the claim that “Edmund Gettier’s landmark paper successfully
refuted the traditional analysis of knowledge” (Sosa et al., 2009, 189). The claim
figures in almost every contemporary handbook.4 It has two components: the
Justified True Belief analysis was the traditional one, and Gettier refuted it.
They cannot both be true. As Gettier (1963) stresses, his counterexamples as-
sume that justification does not entail truth.5 But, as I will argue at length
below, insofar as we can identify justification conditions on knowledge in tra-
ditional views, they are truth-entailing. Thus traditional views are not the ones
Gettier refuted. Be that as it may, it is worth listing a few facts that would be
puzzling if the Legend was true.
Why is it so hard to find statements of the analysis before the mid-twentieth cen-
tury? Plato, Kant and Russell are usually cited.6 But that is it. I am not aware
of any other putative statement in the Western tradition. If there was one it
would have been widely reported by now. So what about Aristotle, Epicurus,
the Stoics, the Sceptics, Thomas, Ockham, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke,
Berkeley, Hume, Reid or Kant, to name a few?
Why did nobody notice Gettier-style cases? The Theaetetus is one of the most
widely read philosophical texts in history. It ends with the suggestion that a
true belief with an “account” is not sufficient for knowledge. So, if the Leg-
end is correct, it raises the question whether justified true belief is sufficient for
knowledge. But somehow nobody noticed counterexamples before the twen-
tieth century. Yet Gettier-style cases are not outlandish. A jury may clear a
defendant on the basis of an apparently reliable testimony; the testimony turns
out to be false, but the defendant is innocent nonetheless. In fact, the trial ex-
ample almost literally appeared in the Theaetetus (201c-d). So why did nobody
notice?
Why were Gettier-style cases presented as cases of true belief that is not knowl-
standard editions, respectively Estienne (e.g. Meno 98a), Bekker (e.g. Posterior Analytics 79b10),
Adam-Tannery (e.g. AT VII:141) and Akademie (e.g. AA 9:72) except for the Critique of Pure Reason
cited in the A/B edition pagination (e.g. A822/B850). Other historical works are cited in their own
divisions (e.g. bk. 2 q. 1). References to translations are provided in the course of the text.
4For a recent sample, see Moser (2002, 4, 29), Huemer (2002, 435), Feldman (2003, 16), Pritchard
and Neta (2008, 5-6), Sosa et al. (2009, 189), Dancy et al. (2010, 395), Hetherington (2011, 119),
Ichikawa and Steup (2014), Goldman and McGrath (2015, 51–2). Dancy (1984, 22), Zagzebski (1999,
100n14), Williams (2001, 16, 26n), Fumerton (2006, 14) and Pritchard (2013, 23) echo the Legend but
without straightforward endorsement. Notable exceptions are Nagel (2014, ch. 4) who only calls
it the “leading theor[y] of [Gettier’s] day” and Audi (2010) who avoids calling it “traditional”
entirely. To be fair, many authors remain vague about what they mean by calling the Justified True
Belief analysis “traditional”. But they presumably mean something stronger than “held by a few
philosophers in the 1950s” or “widely assumed to be traditional”.
5That is also assumed by subsequent Gettier-style cases. For instance, in Ginet-Goldman’s
(1976, 772–3) fake barn case, it is assumed that whatever justifies the subject’s belief that there
is barn would have done so even if they were looking at a fake.
6Plato, Theaetetus 202d, Meno 98a; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A822/B850; Russell (1948, 171).
4
edge? Some recognisably Gettier-style cases were pointed out before Gettier’s
paper: Plato’s jury (Theaetetus 201c-d), Meinong’s doorbell and Aeolian harp
cases (Meinong, 1973, 619; 1906, 30–31; 1973, 398–399), Russell’s Balfour/Ban-
nerman and stopped clock cases (Russell, 1912, ch. 13; 1948, 170–1). All stories
involve true belief, and nothing in them indicates that their character’s beliefs
are unjustified—quite the opposite.7 Yet both Plato and Russell put them for-
ward as cases of true belief that is not knowledge, not of justified true belief that
is not knowledge. Worse, Plato and Russell go on to state what looks like a
Justified True Belief analysis.
Why was the Justified True Belief analysis not presented as the traditional one?
The philosophers Gettier targeted did not present their views as traditional.
Chisholm (1956, 447; 1957, 1, 16) first put it forward as something he “sug-
gested”. It is only after the publication of Gettier’s paper that he called it a
“common” one (1966, 1) and later “the traditional [one]” (1977, 102). Ayer
(1956, 41) sets out his view against the “quest for certainty” which “has played
a considerable part in the history of philosophy”. He gives no indication that
he is reviving a traditional view; quite the opposite.
How the Legend appeared. Looking at what philosophers said about tradi-
tional views of knowledge before Gettier’s paper sheds light on how the Leg-
end appeared. In a 1949 introduction to epistemology the Oxford philosopher
A. D. Woozley writes:
According to the traditional view, which derives from Plato, knowl-
edge and belief are mental faculties, each sui generis, no more to be
defined one in terms of the other than are, say, love and friendship.
(Woozley, 1949, 176)
With the Republic (473c-480a) in mind, Woozley ascribes to the tradition a view
associated with his predecessors John Cook Wilson (1926, 34-47) and Harold
A. Prichard (1950, 86), according to which knowledge is a sui generis mental
state that cannot be defined in terms of belief, let alone as justified true belief.8
Since knowledge entails truth, it is an infallible mental state. That is the view
that Ayer (1956, 15-23) contrasts with his.
In 1960, Gilbert Ryle still ascribes the infallible mental state view to the tra-
dition in his “Epistemology” entry for Urmson’s Concise Encyclopedia.9 Seven
7As Burnyeat (1980, 177-178) points out concerning Plato’s case. Meinong’s cases are less well-
known than Plato’s and Russell’s. In the doorbell one, a man has a pathological ringing in his ears
at the same time as somebody rings the doorbell. In the Aeolian harp one, somebody who lived
near such a harp for a long time has become hard of hearing so that they sometimes hallucinate a
harp sound at the same time as the harp rings.
8See also Price (1934, 229–31).
9Ryle (1960). He only discusses Locke and modern philosophers. Entires were not signed in the
first edition but Ryle is named in later ones (Rée and Urmson, 2004).
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years later, in the “Knowledge” entry for Edward’s Encyclopaedia, Anthony
Quinton (1967) writes that the Justified True Belief analysis was the traditional
one and that it has been refuted by Gettier. What happened? Woozley (1949,
181-184), Malcolm (1952, 179–80) and Ayer (1956, 21) all took the infallible men-
tal state view to have sceptical consequences. That was deemed unacceptable
and prompted Malcolm, Ayer and Chisholm to defend the idea that fallible
justification and truth were sufficient for knowledge. Gettier (1963, 121n) was
perhaps the first to note that a formally similar account appeared in Plato.10
Soon some called the Justified True Belief analysis “traditional” and by 1967
the Legend coalesced.
If that is right the New Story is not so new. A fairly close view was widespread
at the time the Justified True Belief analysis was introduced. But it was lost on
the following generation of epistemologists.11
2 Classical Infallibilism
Epistemological views varied so much across history that one may doubt whether
there is such a thing as “the traditional conception of knowledge”. I think there
is, at least in the Western tradition. It goes as follows:
Classical Infallibilism One knows p iff one has a belief that p bears a dis-
cernible mark of truth, where:
A property of a belief is a mark of truth iff necessarily, only true beliefs
have it,
A property of a belief is discernible iff necessarily, a sufficiently attentive
subject believes that a belief of hers has it if and only if it has.
Section 5 I introduce other forms of Infallibilism. In this section “Infallibilism”
refers to Classical Infallibilism only.12
As the definition makes clear, nothing special is meant by “mark” and
“bearing a mark”. A mark is simply a property of beliefs; a belief “bears” a
mark if it has the property. For instance, the truth of a belief is (trivially) a mark
10Some may also have remembered that Russell (1948, 140) called a formally similar analysis
“traditional”.
11The shift creates a tension that is particularly visible in Chisholm’s Theory of Knowledge. The
first edition merely calls the analysis “common” (1966, 1) but the second calls it “traditional” (1977,
102). Chisholm says that Gettier only refutes view that assume that there are justified (“evident”)
false beliefs (1977, 103). He also thinks that the assumption was rejected at least up until the
seventeenth century (1977, 15n). Yet he claims that Gettier refuted the “traditional” analysis (1977,
103).
12The present account of Classical Infallibilism owes much to Van Cleve (1979), Frede (1987,
1999) and Barnes (1990, 136–7). That is not to say that any of them would endorse it. Note that like
DeRose (1992b) I think Van Cleve’s account is right on Descartes’s cognitio but does not properly
take into account his distinction between cognitio and scientia. See sec. 4.2.
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of truth. But it is not discernible, since even an attentive subject may believe
that one of her beliefs is true while it is not. By contrast, having the content that
it rains seems to be a discernible mark: a sufficiently attentive subject will be-
lieve that a belief of hers has the content that it rains if and only if it has.13 But
that is not a mark of truth, since some beliefs that have that content are false.
Descartes’s “clarity and distinction” is a prototypical example of a putative
discernible mark of truth: on his view, only true beliefs can have a “clear and
distinct” content and a sufficiently attentive subject will believe that a belief
has a clear and distinct content if and only if it has.14
If Infallibilism were put forward today several issues of detail would need
to be addressed. First, the definition of marks of truth is too permissive. The
property of having the content that 331 is prime is one that only true beliefs have.
It may also be discernible. Yet somebody may believe that 331 is prime with-
out thereby knowing that it is. To avoid that, we should say that a property is
a mark of truth if it belongs to a relevant kind of properties that all entail truths.
Having the content that 331 is prime is of a kind that includes having the content
that 333 is prime, which is not truth-entailing. Second, a similar refinement is
needed for discernibility. There may be some brain pattern C such that neces-
sarily, one believes that one’s belief is realised by C just if it is. But we do not
want being realized by C to count as a discernible property. Again, we should
say that a mark is discernible only if marks of its kinds are such that atten-
tive subjects discern them. What kinds count as “relevant”? We may leave it
open. Note that the shift to kinds makes Infallibilism more stringent, so it does
not threaten the main claim I will make: that Infallibilism leads to Scepticism.
Third, we should specify whether our notion of necessity is restricted, say, to
physical possibility. Fourth, we should clarify sufficient attention. It is implic-
itly relative to a belief: a mark of a belief is discernible if it is discerned by a
subject attentive enough to that belief. We need not assume that subjects directly
refer to their belief; it is enough for them to think of it under a description such
as “my belief that 331 is prime”. The definition does not prevent the beliefs
of an unreflective creature from bearing discernible marks provided sufficiently
attentive versions of that creature would be able to reflect on their own beliefs.
More generally, being sufficiently attentive involves an idealised version of the
subject. The more generous the idealisation, the more permissive discernibility
is. Some recherché cases may cause further trouble but we need not get into
13Or so it seems. Williamson´s (2000, chap. 4) anti-luminosity argument can be adapted to
argue that there must be cases where even a sufficiently attentive subject could be mistaken about
whether a belief of hers has the content that it rains; and more generally, to argue that nothing is
discernible. However, that is a surprising—and still controversial—result, and it is a fair bet that it
would have come as a surprise to past philosophers too.
14See section 4.
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them.15 Sixth, a basing condition is missing. A belief’s having the content that
one is in pain and being held by a person in pain is a mark of truth and one may
think it is discernible. Yet a person in pain who believes that they are in pain
only because their crystal ball says so does not know that they are in pain.
The account should require that the belief be somehow based on its bearing a
discernible mark of truth.16 One option is to introduce a separate basing con-
dition. Another is to restrict our choice of marks to properties of the kind being
based on thus-and-so. The second is more stringent as it requires basing facts
themselves to be discernible.
Until recently philosophers hardly ever raised such issues. Sometimes we
can argue that they implicitly adopted some answer or that their views com-
mitted them to one. But it is often pointless to ask what their answer would
have been.
Discernibility is akin to two notions in the recent epistemology literature:
luminosity and cognitive access. Some epistemologists talk of what is “cogni-
tively accessible” to a subject. That is sometimes glossed as facts the subject
is “capable of becoming aware of” (BonJour, 2010, 364) or as facts she is ca-
pable of becoming aware of “upon reflection” (Chisholm, 1977, 16–7). On an
ordinary reading of these phrases, I am aware that it is daylight now and I
am capable of becoming aware upon reflection that I ate some bread yester-
day. That is not, however, the way these epistemologists use these phrases.
Their guiding intuition is that facts one has “access” to are just those facts that
one would still know if one were in some Cartesian Demon scenario. But they
do not define the notion that way; rather, it is supposed to follow from some
natural notion of “access” that what we have access to withstands Descartes’s
Demon. I suggest that the notion of discernible fact is the one they have in
mind.17 Williamson (2000, 95) calls a condition—something a subject is in at
a certain time—luminous just if necessarily, a subject who is in that condition
15For instance, if necessarily, sufficiently attentive subjects believe that they are attentive, then
being an unattended-to belief turns out to be trivially discernible. It is unclear that the result is bad.
If it is, we may say that discernibility requires the antecedent to be non-trivially satisfied.
16It may seem paradoxical to say that a belief could based on some its own features. To see that
is not, consider a parallel with action. I may run from A to B because that is a way of reaching B, or
because that is a way to exercise. We may then say that my undertaking the action was based on the
action having these features. Similarly I may form a belief on the basis of certain features it would
have if formed.
17Contrast Fumerton’s (2006, 53) suggestion that the intended notion of “access” is access by
introspection. Introspection is supposed to be a reflective way of find out about one’s own inter-
nal mental states. Thus while in an ordinary sense of “reflection”, one can find out by reflection
whether one has eaten bread yesterday (an external fact), whether one’s heart is beating (a inter-
nal, non-mental fact) or whether one saw a cat yesterday (a non-internal mental state), these are
not instances of introspection, because the subject-matter of introspection is restricted to internal
mental states. But if introspection plays a special epistemological role, it cannot be merely because
it has a distinctive subject-matter. Rather, introspection is singled out because—it is assumed—it
is a way of knowing that has a special property. I suggest that the property is discernibility: it is
assumed that facts that can be known by introspection are discernible.
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is in position to know that they are in it. Being in pain is a candidate for be-
ing a luminous condition, for instance. Discernibility is intended to capture
the same alleged phenomenon. The difference is that luminosity is defined in
terms of what one is a position to know, while discernibility is defined in terms
of what attentive subjects would believe. The advantage of the notion of lumi-
nosity is that it requires less of the refinements the notion discernibility needs.
The drawback is that using it would not allow us to give Infallibilism the famil-
iar form of a reductive analysis. For the sake of familiarity I use the reductive
form. But my main claims would not be affected by replacing discernibility
with luminosity.
Historically many philosophers adopted a foundationalist outlook on which
some knowledge is basic and the rest derived. Basic knowledge was conceived
as above. Derived knowledge was thought to derive from knowledge through
some sort of truth-preserving inference. Do we need an additional clause for it?
Not necessarily. It think these philosophers took the fact that some belief was
inferred from others in the relevant way to be discernible as well. If so, derived
beliefs would bear complex discernible marks of truth along the lines of: being
inferred in such and a such a way from beliefs that bear such and such marks. A dif-
ficulty arises with long chains of inference since premise beliefs may have lost
their marks by the time the conclusion is reached. The difficulty was seldom
raised.18 We set it aside.19
Some philosophers additionally required that the mark forces assent. That is,
the property should be one that cannot be present without the subject’s being
inclined to believe. Call that a convincing mark. We will treat it as an optional
component of Infallibilism.
Many past philosophers freely move between objectual and propositional knowl-
edge. To accommodate their views we may broaden the notion of truth to some
notion of correct representation. We leave the complication aside.
Crucially, a (convincing) discernible mark of truth is all that Infallibilism re-
quires. It does not additionally requires that one knows, or believes, or is aware
that a given mark is truth-entailing.20 On some conceptions of discernible
marks, Infallibilism will entail various principles such as: if M is a discernible
18Some take the difficulty to be central to Descartes’s Meditations. See Van Cleve (1979) for critical
discussion.
19Note that Infallibilism is not wedded to foundationalism. One could think that cohering in
such-and-such a way with one’s other beliefs is a discernible mark of truth. A coherentist version of
Infallibilism results. Russell (1948, 142) states the “coherence theory of knowledge” in such terms
and loosely attributes it to Hegel. More radically, one could think that coherence is a property of
sets of beliefs that guarantees that most beliefs in a set are true—perhaps without guaranteeing of
any single one that it is true. A holistic version of Infallibilism results on which knowledge is not
a property of individual beliefs but of collections of them. Davidson (2001) may have held such a
view.
20Compare Van Cleve (1979) and Barnes (1990, 136–7).
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mark of truth then a belief that M is truth-entailing bears a discernible mark of
truth; if one’s belief that p bears a discernible mark of truth then one’s belief
that one knows p bears one too, and so on. But such principles are at best conse-
quences of how discernible marks are conceived, not additional requirements
on knowledge.
3 Classical Infallibilism in Hellenistic Epistemol-
ogy
This section shows Classical Infallibilism at work in Hellenistic epistemology.
Why Hellenistic epistemology? As Brunschwig (1999, 229) writes, “it is gen-
erally agreed that the Hellenistic period is the great age of ancient epistemol-
ogy”. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle mostly discussed expert knowledge: ge-
ometry, astronomy, medicine, politics, philosophy and so on—what we may
now call theoretical disciplines or sciences.21 Their Hellenistic successors were
squarely interested in ordinary knowledge: knowing that something is sweet,
that something is a dog, that someone is your child (LS 39C, 40H). The shift
was so significant that Brunschwig (1999) calls it an “epistemological turn”.22
The founders of two new schools, Epicurus (341-271) and Zeno of Citium (334-
262), argued that there were “criteria of truth”, yardsticks with which opin-
ions could be tested for knowledge. Soon after Arcesilaus took the head of the
Academy (c.273 to c.242) and gave it a distinctively sceptical orientation. For
the next two centuries, Greek epistemology was dominated by the sharp and
sustained debate between the Stoa of Zeno and Chrysippus (head 232-c.206)
and the ‘New Academy’ of Arcesilaus and Carneades (head from mid-second
century BCE to 137). It stalled as Athens’s great schools disintegrated around
100 BCE. We find it recorded in Cicero’s Academica and in Sextus Empiricus’s
Against the professors as well as in various other sources—though what remains
is but a fragment of what there was. By then, the concepts and doctrines of
Stoic and Academic epistemology were assimilated in the philosophical com-
21When Socrates claimed not to “know” anything he did not seem to deny that he knew that
he was standing, in Athens, or awake. See Vlastos (1985) for further discussion. For Aristotle, see
Burnyeat (1981), Irwin (1988, 118), Barnes (1993, 82), Pasnau (2013, 991–3); though see Irwin (2010)
for a more guarded view. For Plato, see Burnyeat (1970, 1990, 216–8), Annas (1982), Nehamas
(1984, 1985) and Kaplan (1985, 351–3); but see Fine (2004, 70) for an opposite view. While the
Republic plausibly deals with a scientific ideal (Pasnau, 2013, 990n4), I agree with Fine that some of
Plato’s examples in the Meno and the Theaetetus (knowing the way to Larissa, knowing whether a
defendant is guilty) suggest that he intends to cover ordinary knowledge. I discuss Plato’s views
in section 4.
22The shift may have been prompted by radical sceptical challenges (Long and Sedley, 1987,
xviii): “Anaxarchus and Monimus [...] compared existing things to stage-painting and took them
to be like experiences that occur in sleep or insanity” (LS 1D). See Brunschwig (1999) for further
discussion.
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mon ground and were poised to have a lasting influence.23
Stoics distinguished two knowledge-like states: cognition and knowledge.24
By “knowledge”, they meant rich systems of cognitions that are immune to
objections.25 That is close to Plato’s and Aristotle’s picture of expert knowl-
edge.26 Stoics treated it as an ideal that few, if any, had ever reached. Though
they use the ordinary Greek word for knowledge we would rather call that wis-
dom or science.27 By “cognition”, however, they meant something much more
like what we would ordinarily call “knowledge”.28 Here we are interested in
their theory of “cognition”, and we will simply call it knowledge.29
Knowledge is assent to a cognitive impression (LS 40B). Impressions are
quite literally images imprinted into the mind. They have content. We can
assent to them, that is, believe their content, or not.30 Among impressions,
23See Frede (1987, 176). The last head of Plato’s Academy, Philo, relaxed scepticism to the point
of allowing the formation of “convincing” opinion (see below note 72). That was widely perceived
to make the Academic doctrine unstable and apparently prompted the departure of two talented
pupils who founded influential schools. Aenesidemus founded a ’proper’ Sceptical school, the
Pyrrhonist one, to which Sextus Empiricus (second century CE) belonged. Antiochus founded a
new dogmatic Academy that adopted the Stoic’s conception of knowledge—presented as Plato’s
own. See Long and Sedley (1987, 449). Thus Epicureans aside, all major schools in the first century
BCE inherited the conception of knowledge from the Stoic-Sceptic debate. The neo-Platonic school
in particular would influence Augustine whose Contra Academicos was in turn the main source on
scepticism for early medieval authors.
24See e.g. LS 41A. The word translated as “cognition” is katale¯psis, a neologism that literally
means apprehension or grasping. Cicero translates perceptio, whose original meaning is taking, col-
lecting (as in “perceiving taxes”). “Knowledge” is episte¯me¯.
25See LS 41A, 41B, 41C, 41H and Annas (1990, 187-188). “Immune to objections” corresponds to
the Stoic phrase “firm and unchangeable by reason”, which Long and Sedley (1987, 257) interpret
as being “impregnable to any reasoning that might be adduced to persuade a change of mind”.
26See Fine (2003, 114–5) on Plato’s coherentism about “knowledge” and Barnes (1993, xii-xiii)
and Burnyeat (1981) on Aristotle’s demonstrative conception of “knowledge”.
27See Barnes (1980, 204): “The verb ’epistasthai,’ and its cognates ’episte¯me¯’ and ’episte¯mo¯n,’ are
not philosophical neologisms; they occur frequently in Greek literature from Homer onwards, and
they are there correctly translated by ’know’ and its cognates.” In the Stoic context, Long and
Sedley nevertheless translate episte¯me¯ as “scientific knowledge” (Long and Sedley, 1987, 257).
28Long and Sedley (1987, 257): “It would be possible to translate katale¯psis by ’knowledge’ in
many contexts”. See also Annas (1990, 184-185, 189).
29For overviews of Stoic epistemology see Long and Sedley (1987, sections 39-42), Annas (1990)
and Frede (1999). The account below essentially follows Frede’s (1987; 1999). Reed (2002b, 150n7,
153n14) suggests that Frede shifted views on whether the Stoics added their third clause as a fur-
ther requirement (in Frede, 1987) or as a clarification of the first two (in Frede, 1999). We should
distinguish two issues here: whether satisfying the first two clauses was supposed to entail sat-
isfying the third and whether the third clause is was supposed to clarify of the first two. What
matters for my purposes is the entailment issue, for if early Stoics defended an account on which
“cognitions” could violate the third clause they were not Classical Infallibilists. Fortunately Frede
answered that question positively in both works: see Frede (1987, 165) (“the Stoics think that any
impression which satisfies the first two conditions will in fact also satisfy the third”) Frede (1999,
312) (“Given that the third clause is treated as merely clarificatory and redundant”). The “clarifi-
cation” issue has no impact on our discussion and the account below is neutral on it.
30See Frede (1987, 152-157). It is controversial whether Stoics thought that all impressions come
from the senses, though that is definitely their paradigmatic case (see Brennan, 1996 for discussion).
Reed (2002b, 169–70) suggests that Stoics only loosely talk of impressions as having content: strictly
speaking, they are associated with one or several propositions which are themselves content (or
have content; Reed oscillates between the two). The loose reading is enough for present purposes.
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some are “cognitive”. They are characterized thus:31
A cognitive impression is one which arises from what is and is
stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what is, of such
a kind that could not arise from what is not. (LS 40E, see also LS
40C, 40D)
Since cognitive impressions are “impressed exactly in accordance with what
is”, beliefs based on them are true (Frede, 1987, 164). So they are marks of
truth. Are they discernible? Arguably, that is what the third clause was meant
to secure. First, Stoics took cognitive impressions to differ from others:
’Of such a kind as could not arise from what is not’ was added by
the Stoics, since the Academics did not share their view of the im-
possibility of finding a totally indiscernible [but false] impression.
For the Stoics say that one who has the cognitive impression fas-
tens on the objective difference of things in a craftsman-like way,
since this kind of impression has a peculiarity which differentiates
it from other impressions, just as horned snakes are different from
others. (LS 40E)
The difference was sometimes said to be that cognitive impressions are “clear
and distinct” (LS 40C). Second, Stoics thought that it is possible to assent only
to impressions that are cognitive (LS 40D, 41G). Presumably, that is because a
sufficiently attentive subject can tell cognitive impressions apart (Frede 1999,
314–6; as Frede points out, that may involve some training). Thus cognitive
impressions are discernible.32
Knowledge requires nothing more. It is not required that one knows, be-
lieves or is otherwise aware that one’s assent is to a cognitive impression. The
unwise assent to cognitive and non-cognitive impressions alike, and yet they
have knowledge (LS 40C). Nor it is required that one antecedently knows that
cognitive impressions are true (Frede, 1999, 299, Barnes, 1990, 132–6).
While details remain blurry, the overall Stoic picture is clear enough. When
one’s eyes are open, one is close enough and in a well-lit area, one can get an
impression of an object of a kind that one could not get otherwise. When the
conditions are right, one can get an impression of Socrates of a kind that one
could not get from a twin. When one is wide awake, one gets impressions such
that one could not get while dreaming. More generally, it is always possible to
discern that one’s impression is of the cognitive kind. This does not mean that
one can always tell whether an impression is true or false; but one can always
31All Hellenistic texts are cited in Long and Sedley’s (1987) translations.
32Some texts indicate that they are also convincing, that is, they force assent (LS 40H, 40O). This
may be what their “clarity and distinction” consists in (Frede, 1987, 168).
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tell whether an impression is of the cognitive kind or not. And when it is, it is
guaranteed to be true. Having a belief based on such an impression is all that
(ordinary) knowledge requires. So, surprising as it may be to us, Stoics were
committed to the claim that there are some impressions one gets when one
perceives that cannot be like the ones one gets in dreams, and that there are
some impressions one gets from seeing a certain man that could not be had by
seeing his twin (see LS 40I, LS 40C and Frede, 1987, 162–3).
Not only Stoics thought that there was a discernible class of true impres-
sions, but their debate with Academic sceptics was premised on the claim that
without it, there could not be any knowledge:
Zeno defined [a cognitive impression] as an impression stamped
and reproduced from something which is, exactly as it is. Arcesi-
laus next asked whether this was still valid if a true impression was
just like a false one. At this point Zeno was sharp enough to see that
if an impression from what is were such that an impression from what is
not could be just like it, there was no cognitive impression. Arcesilaus
agreed that it was right to add this to the definition, since neither a
false impression nor a true one would be cognitive if the latter were
just such as even a false one could be. But he applied all his force
to this point of the argument, in order to show that no impression
arising from something true is such that an impression arising from
something false could not also be just like it. This is the one contro-
versial issue which has lasted to the present [Cicero’s times]. (LS
40D, emphasis mine)
Thus Sceptics granted—if only for the sake of argument—that knowledge re-
quired discernible marks of truth. But they denied there were any. They used
the now familiar tools of the sceptical trade: fakes (a wax pomegranate, LS
40F), duplicates (two eggs or twins, LS 40H), dreams (LS 40H) and madness
(LS 40H). More generally, they argued that for any particular property that was
supposed to set cognitive impressions apart, a false impression could have it:
Carneades claimed that a false impression could be as “striking” and “self-
evident” as any true one (LS 40H).
It is worth contrasting the New Story’s account with others. On one read-
ing, sometimes called “internalist”, Stoics require that one can antecedently
know that cognitive impressions are true.33 That makes it puzzling why Aca-
demic Sceptics did not raise a regress issue (Frede, 1987, 167; Frede, 1999, 314).
33See Frede (1987, 160, 167), who presents (and rejects) a traditional account on which “Stoic
impressions [are] pictures or images of the world which can be looked at introspectively, with the
mind’s eye, as it were, to see whether they have this feature that guarantees their truth.” The state-
ment is ambiguous between two accounts. On the first, the Stoic view is that one can introspect
whether the feature in question entails truth. That is the “internalist” account Frede and I reject. On the
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On the present account, Stoics require that it be discernible that beliefs bear cer-
tain marks, which are in fact marks of truth; not that it be discernible that certain
marks are marks of truth. On another reading, called “externalist”, Stoics merely
required that impressions had the right kind of causal history (Annas, 1990,
197 and Barnes, 1990, 131–6). That makes it puzzling why Stoics did not point
out that fakes and duplicates fail to show that no impression has the right kind
of causal history. That also makes it hard to see why they thought that it was
possible to assent only to impressions that are cognitive (Reed, 2002b, 155–7).
On the present account, the causal history of cognitive impressions matters
only because it confers them intrinsic features that are discernible (Frede, 1987,
162).34,35
second, the Stoics held that there is a truth-entailing feature such that one can introspect whether im-
pressions have it; but there is no claim that one can introspect whether the feature is truth-entailing.
That is compatible with Classical Infallibilism and not “internalist” in the sense above. Now Frede
also rejects the second account because he thinks that on the Stoic view, being attuned to cogni-
tive impressions is not a matter of introspection but of exercising one’s sensitivity to their intrinsic
features (Frede, 1999, 315). However the non-introspective account is still within the bounds of
Classical Infallibilism, because it is still held that a sufficiently attentive (i.e., exercised) subject will
be such that necessarily, they believe that a certain impression is cognitive just if it is.
34A similar story can be told about another apparently externalist trend in Stoic epistemology,
namely the addition of a “no-impediment” clause to the Stoic definition of basic knowledge. Under
pressure from Sceptics, later Stoics added held that a cognitive impression should be “unimpeded”
or “undiverted” (LS 40K). Some texts suggest that the “impediments” in question consist in the
dysfunction of sense organs or an unfavourable position of the subject (LS 40L). Long and Sedley
(1987, 251-252) conclude that later Stoics endorsed what amounts to a contemporary externalist
position: one knows provided that when everything is functioning normally, sense impressions
are truthful. This would amount to a rejection of the discernibility requirement. I doubt the read-
ing is defensible: if Stoics had rejected it, Sceptics would have forcefully pointed it out and Cicero
would have reported it. Rather, I suggest that the Stoic view was that dysfunctions of one’s sense
organs would be reflected in discernible aspects of one’s experience. Indeed, several other texts
suggest that the “impediments” of an impression are other impressions of the subject which in-
dicate that the former impression is false, that is, defeating impressions (LS 40K, LS69E). (LS69E is
about Carneades’s notion of impediment, but later Stoics adopted it.)
35Reed (2002b, 167–80) defends an alternative account on which (a) early Stoics were indirect
realists, (b) Academics raised problems for the view, which (c) later Stoics tried to meet by adopt-
ing a disjunctivist view. While I cannot discuss the account properly here, let me briefly indicate
why I do not endorse it. First, the evidence for (a) only comes LS 40B, in which it is said that Zeno
took sensations to be a compound of impressions with an act of assent. Reed (2002b, 168) comes
that “in order to assent to the [impression], the subject must be aware of it”. But LS 40B does not
talk of assenting to an impression. Moreover, it describes impressions as “a sort of blow provided
from outside”, which suggests an alteration of mind rather than an image we introspect (Frede,
1999, 315). Second, Reed does not detail how Academic arguments threaten the indirect realist
view. Suppose that, as Reed suggests, early Stoics took “cognitive impressions” to be images re-
sembling what is, caused by what is. Academics point out that the same images could be caused
by other things. From that one should infer that our impressions could fail to be cognitive—and
further down the line, that even the wise cannot in principle avoid error entirely. But inference
drawn was that none of our impressions were cognitive (LS 40D). Why? Third, the evidence for
(c) comes from Chrysippus’ distinction between impressions, which are caused by an “impressor”,
and figments, which are not (LS 53G): as in contemporary disjunctivist views, there is no common
factor between impressions and delusions (Reed, 2002b, 171). But nothing indicates that the dis-
tinction was thought to be relevant to the debate with Academics: on the contrary, the discussion
exclusively focus on the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive impressions. Fourth nei-
ther of the two views ascribed to Stoics supports their claim that it is in principle possible to avoid
assent to non-cognitive impressions entirely (LS 41G). The only view that does support it is the
“ungrounded, and quite implausible, insistence that false impressions simply cannot be as rich
and vivid as some true impressions” (Reed, 2002b, 153). That is the Classical Infallibilism I claim
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Reed (2002b, 160) doubts that Stoics held the view that “false impressions
could not result in the very same behaviour that cognitive impressions pro-
duce” because it is “obviously incorrect”.36 Now if Stoics are Classical Infalli-
bilists, they need not deny that some cognitive impression and some false im-
pression have the same actual effects. But they need to deny that they would
have the same effects even if the subject was attentive enough. Many contempo-
rary epistemologists will that claim obviously incorrect too. But it is no more
obviously incorrect than the view that it is in principle possible to avoid false
belief entirely, which Stoics clearly held. In fact, as surprising as it may be,
we find philosophers holding the view up until the twentieth century. Thus
G.E. Moore tentatively held that some wakeful experiences are discernible:
But what I am in doubt of is whether it is logically possible that
I should both be having all the sensory experiences and the mem-
ories I have and yet be dreaming. The conjunction of the propo-
sition that I have these sense experiences and memories with the
proposition that I am dreaming does seem to me to be very likely
self-contradictory.(Moore, 1993, 194)37
Malcolm argued that the presence of an ink-bottle in front of him was dis-
cernible:
Now could it turn out to be false that there is an ink-bottle directly
in front of me on this desk ? [. . . ] It could happen that when I next
reach for this ink-bottle my hand should seem to pass through it
and I should not feel the contact of any object. [. . . ] Having admit-
ted that these things could happen, am I compelled to admit that if
they did happen then it would be proved that there is no ink-bottle
here now? Not at all! (Malcolm, 1952, 185)
And the Oxford Realist H.A. Prichard took knowing to be discernible:38
We must recognise that when we know something we either do, or
by reflecting, can know that our condition is one of knowing that
they held.
36Reed (2002b, 160) approvingly quotes Carneades for that claim (LS 40H, which says that false
impressions are “equally self-evidence and striking”). But it seems clear to me that it was com-
monly granted that if Stoics conceded that claim to Carneades they were defeated. If so it would
be natural to think that Stoics did hold it.
37What allowed Moore to hope that the conjunction was logically contradictory was his Ideal-
ist view that ordinary objects were to be analysed in terms of sense-data. See section 4 on how
Classical Infallibilism motivates Idealism.
38See also Marion (2000a, 313) on Cook Wilson’s infallibilism. Marion (2000a, 314) claims that
on Cook Wilson’s view, knowing p and “being under the impression” that p are indistinguishable.
But the passage he quotes suggests that Cook Wilson took them to be distinguishable on reflec-
tion: “if we really thought we knew, we must have reflected and must have thought the evidence
conclusive, whereas, ex hypothesi, any reflection shows it could not be conclusive” (my emphasis).
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thing, while when we believe something, we either do or can know
that our condition is one of believing and not of knowing: so that
we cannot mistake belief for knowledge or vice versa. (Prichard,
1950, 88)
There is little reason to think that the incorrectness of the view should have
been more obvious to the Stoics than it was to Moore, Malcolm, or Prichard.39
Epicurus, head of the the other dogmatic Hellenistic school, held an even
more extreme view. He took all knowledge to derive from the senses (LS 16A)
and famously claimed that “all sense-impressions are true” (LS 16F). He could
do so by holding a narrow conception of their content: vision only directly
tells us about colours and “shape at a distance”, for instance.40 Plausibly, he
took having a sense-impression to be discernible. But unlike Stoics, he did not
think it possible to discern a special class of sense-impressions.41 So claiming
that all are true would have been the only way to secure the existence of dis-
cernible marks of truth. Indeed, Epicurus seems to have embraced the claim as
the sole alternative to scepticism.42 Epicurean epistemology fits the Classical
Infallibilist schema as well.43
The phrase criterion of truth was introduced by Epicurus and adopted by
subsequent schools. Epicureans said sense-impressions were the criterion; Sto-
ics said it was cognitive impressions; Sceptics denied there was one.44 I suggest
that by criterion of truth they meant discernible marks of truth.
39A few mitigating circumstances for the Stoics are worth mentioning. First, they may have been
implicitly working with some restricted notion of possibility—say, physical possibility. Second,
they may have understimated what is possible in that sense: as salient as they are to us, sceptical
scenarios involving an Evil Demon or a world created five minutes ago were not brought up until
much later. Note also that Stoics are fatalists, so sceptical scenarios are possible only if actual.
Third, they arguably did not think that the discernibility of cognitive impressions was a matter
of a simple introspective check, but rather a matter of being sensitive to their distinctive features,
which would require some training (Frede, 1999, 315).
40Long and Sedley (1987, 84). Compare Aristotle’s De Anima 428b18–24.
41LS 16B: “neither can sense refute sense, because of their equal validity”.
42“What is Epicurus’s principle? If any sense-perception is false, it is not possible to perceive
[have cognition of] anything.” (Cicero, Lucullus, 32.101, trans. Everson, 1990, 161)
43Unlike Cyrenaics who held that we only know about our impressions, Epicurus allowed
knowledge of things beyond the immediate objects of the senses. Like Aristotle before him and the
Stoics after him, his account involved the formation of “preconceptions” in the mind after repeated
exposure to impressions of things. Though I cannot examine them in detail here, my contention is
that these doctrines were at the very least compatible with Classical Infallibilism. See Frede (1999,
318–20) for a favourable discussion. By contrast, Everson (1990, 180) ascribes to Epicurus a falli-
bilist view on which inferences from sense-impressions to further facts deliver knowledge despite
being “vulnerable to error”. There is no direct textual support for this view; Everson infers it from
(1) the fact that Epicurus was not an external world sceptic and (2) the fact that Epicurus does not
seem to have a reply to the sceptical objection that our inferences from sense-impressions are not
truth-preserving. While the objection is recorded (Striker, 1977, 141), the alleged fallibilist response
does not fit well with Epicurus’s strict requirement on a “criterion of truth” to “exclude falsehood”
(LS 40B, see Long and Sedley, 1987, 88).
44LS 40A. Chrysippus sometimes added “preconception”; but it is plausible preconceptions are
derived from cognitive impressions in ways that make them discernible marks of truths as well.
See Frede (1999, 318–20) and the previous footnote.
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4 Classical Infallibilism in Western Philosophy
The New Story’s bold hypothesis is that before 1950, virtually every Western
philosopher was a Classical Infallibilist. The best I can aim for here is to show
that it deserves serious consideration. Let me review some salient evidence.
4.1 Medieval epistemology
It is worth tracing the posterity of the Hellenistic debate through the Middle
Ages.45 Much evidence in favour of the New Story would found along the
way. Some evidence against too, which we discuss below. But it is too complex
a history to be explored here.46
45See Perler (2010), Pasnau (2010b), Lagerlund (2010) and Bolyard (2013) for good overviews—
mainly focused on Western Europe—and the valuable collections of Pasnau (2002) and Klima
(2007). Two issues are worth flagging. (1) Conceptual divisions. Medieval epistemology tends to
draw on Aristotle and the Stoic-Academic debate. Both arguably distinguish ordinary knowledge
from systematic theoretical knowledge, or, for short, knowledge from science (see fn. 21 above
and sec. 4.8 below). In Western Europe, however, Cicero’s Academica was barely known (Hunt,
1998, 26–30) and the main source on the Hellenistic debate is Augustine’s (354–430 CE) Contra
Academicos, which fails to heed the distinction. When Western philosophers discovered Aristotle’s
Posterior Analytics in the twelfth century their translations (e.g. Aquinas’s) did use two terms, sci-
entia and cognitio, for Aristotle’s episte¯me¯ and gignoskein. But they may understand the distinction
differently: Pasnau (2002, 5–6) suggests that cognitio is the most general term for mental represen-
tations or thoughts. In practice medieval authors tend instead to theorize the contrast between
knowledge and science in terms of of grades of scientia (Pasnau, 2010b). As a result, it is sometimes
hard to tell whether certain views are counterexamples to the New Story. For instance, some late
medieval philosophers distinguished a lower sense of “comprehension of truth” or even “knowl-
edge” that was just true belief (see e.g. Martens, 2011). Did they think that in its most general
sense knowledge includes mere true belief? Or were they merely pointing out that “grasping the
truth” is ambiguous between knowing proper and having a true belief ? (2) Conceptual innovations.
Certainty (al-yaqı¯n, certitudo) became a central epistemic category with Islamic philosophy (Black,
2006). Evidentness (evidentia) is another medieval innovation. I suspect that both can be understood
in Classical Infallibilist terms, but they should be discussed in more detail. It is worth noting that
medieval philosophers were almost unanimous in requiring “certainty” for knowledge. Nicholas
of Autrecourt may be a rare exception (sec. 4.7 below).
46Let me highlight three episodes. (1) Al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯’s non-accidentality clause. Al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ (c. 872–951)
calls certitude the endpoint of Aristotelian demonstration. He lists six conditions for “absolute cer-
titude” that p: S believes p, p is true, S knows that p is true, p is necessary, p is eternal, and the
previous conditions hold “essentially, not accidentally” (Black, 2006, 16). The issue here is to under-
stand the relation between certain knowledge—what satisfies the six conditions—and knowledge—
what appears in the third condition. (Black (2006, 20) points out that al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ could have used
a different Arabic word for the latter but he did not. That suggests that he deliberately avoided
to reproduce Aristotle’s distinction between episte¯me¯ and gignoskein.) Now al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ spelled out
the “necessity” and “eternity” clauses in ways that arguably makes them not modal or temporal
but rather some kind of infallibility requirement (see Black, 2006 for an enlightening discussion).
If so the sixth clause suggests that one could satisfy the knowledge clause without satisfying the infal-
liblity ones. That would make al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ a counterexample to the New Story. Black (2006, 29–31)
however suggests the the clause is in fact superfluous. (2) Divine illumination theories. Relying on
Cicero, Augustine’s Contra Academicos raises the core issue of the Hellenistic debate and defends on
broadly Epicurean answer (Bolyard, 2006). The Epicurean view ensures the truth of all impressions
by drastically restricting their content puts a heavy load on “preconceptions” or inferences from
sense-impressions. In Augustine’s view these were supplied by God. Divine illumination theories
dominated the early Middle Ages from Augustine through al-Ghaza¯lı¯ (1058–1111 CE, Kukkonen,
2010) up to Henry of Ghent (c. 1217–1293 CE). A recurrent idea is that without divine illumination
we would not know much. I submit that divine illumination was taken to be necessary for there
to be discernible marks of truth. (3) The late medieval debate over scepticism. Henry of Ghent’s dis-
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4.2 Easy cases: Descartes and Locke
Descartes is routinely presented as if his Meditations were meant to establish
knowledge of the external world.47 If so, Descartes takes himself to be the
first man to discover that there are trees—or at the very least, the first one
to discover that we know that there are trees. I find it hard to read him that
way. Descartes is better understood by taking seriously his distinction be-
tween “cognition” (cognitio) and “science” (scientia).48 What he takes himself
to pioneer is a new science for metaphysics and other domains of theoretical
enquiry.49 Doing so requires pretending that we have no cognition of what can
be doubted and overcoming these doubts in an orderly manner. Cognition,
on the other hand, consists in a “clear and distinct perception” that something
is so.50 Descartes claims that clear and distinct perception entails truth.51 He
evidently thinks that, if we are attentive enough, we will believe that we have
a clear and distinction perception just if we have one. So clear and distinct
perception is a discernible mark of truth. And that is all that cognition—as
opposed to science—requires.52 So Descartes is a Classical Infallibilist about
cognition. Seen in this light, Descartes’s two-tiered epistemology is remark-
ably close to that of the Stoics.
cussion of Academics sparked an intense debate that lasted until the arrival of the Black Death in
the mid-fourteenth. The debate was fueled by a wider conception of the possible, as most philoso-
phers agreed that God’s omnipotence was not constrained by regularities of nature. Nevertheless
a first wave of philosophers defended what appears to be Classical Infallibilist answers on which,
roughly, intellect is in principle always in position to correct the senses: see e.g. Perler, 2010, 387
and Grellard (2004, 132–3) on John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308) and Karger (2004) on William of
Ockham (c. 1287–1347; but see Pannaccio and Piché, 2010 for a fallibilist reading). However a sec-
ond wave put forward answers that seem to reject Classical Infallibilism We return to the two most
prominent examples below (sec. 4.7).
47See e.g. Williams (2005, 15, 19-20), for which Descartes aims at showing how knowledge is
possible and at devising a method for acquiring it.
48In the Second Replies: “However, I do not deny that an atheist could know [cognoscere] clearly
that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; I am simply affirming that his
knowledge [cognitionem] is not true scientific knowledge [scientiam], since no knowledge [cognitio]
that can be rendered doubtful seems to deserve to be called scientific knowledge [scientia].” (AT
VII:141, trans. Ariew and Cress in Descartes, 2006, 83). Cottingham (Descartes, 1984, 101) translates
cognitio as “awareness” and scientia as “knowledge”. DeRose (1992b), Sosa (1997) and Carriero
(2007) argue that the distinction between cognitio and scientia is crucial to Descartes’s avoidance of
circularity in the Meditations.
49See Frankfurt (1970, chap. 2), Wolterstorff (1996, 180–218), Pasnau (2013, 1000–1). The stated
goal of Descartes’s meditator is “to establish [something] in the sciences” (First Meditation, AT
VII:17). Descartes writes to Mersenne: “These six Meditations contain all the foundations of my
physics.” (January 28, 1641, AT III:298). Some texts (notably the Regulae) suggest that Descartes
thought that the scientific ideal was achieved in mathematics. But the passage of the Second Replies
quoted above suggests that even mathematics fall short.
50“In this first item of knowledge [cognitione] there is simply a clear and distinct perception of
what I am asserting” (Third Meditation, AT VII:35, Descartes, 1984, 24). Carriero (2007, 306–7) takes
this passage to state what cognition involves in general.
51“So I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very dearly
and distinctly is true” (AT VII:35, Descartes, 1984, 24).
52See AT VII:141 quoted above. While I am confident that Descartes took cognition to be a
widespread achievement, I leave open whether he embraced a fairly sceptical view of it, denying
e.g. that we had any cognition of things like colours.
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Locke (1975, IV, 1, §2) states that “knowledge is the perception of the agree-
ment or disagreement of two ideas”. I suggest that “perception” is a truth-
entailing and discernible state, so that Locke’s definition is an instance of Clas-
sical Infallibilism.53 Evidence of this can be found in his discussion of sceptical
worries. Locke held that we have “sensitive knowledge” of the existence of
external things we currently perceive (Locke, 1975, IV, 2, §14, 3, §5, §21). He
raised the sceptical objection that one could have the idea of something exter-
nal without there being something external (Locke, 1975, IV, 2, §14). His first
and main answer is that impressions originating from external things are dis-
cernible:
But yet here I think we are provided with an evidence that puts
us past doubting. For I ask any one, Whether he be not invinci-
bly conscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks
on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually
tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks on that savour
or odour? We as plainly find the difference there is between any
idea revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually com-
ing into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct
ideas. (Locke, 1975, IV, 2, §14)
Thus Locke takes knowledge of the existence of external things to require that
there is a discernible class of impressions that entail the existence of external
things.54
4.3 Open cases: Plato and Kant
The Legend takes Plato and Kant to hold the Justified True Belief view. But is it
at least open whether they endorsed Classical Infallibilism instead. Plato may
have endorsed the definition of knowledge as “true belief with an account”.55
53Newman (2007, 319–321) finds it surprising that Locke appears not to have endorsed the “tra-
ditional” justified true belief view, and removes the supposed anomaly by arguing that Locke did
endorse it. But he makes clear that Locke’s “justification” is truth-entailing.
54Locke’s second answer is ad hominem:the Sceptic should give up arguing if he thinks that he is
merely dreaming that he argues. His third answer, interestingly, hints at idealism. We return to it
below.
55See mainly Theaetetus 202d, but also Meno 98a2, Phaedo 76b5-6, Symposium 202a5-9, Repub-
lic 534b3-7 and Timaeus 51b6-e6. The definition is found unsatisfactory in the Theaetetus 201-210.
However, since Plato uses it approvingly elsewhere, one may argue that it is only the account
of “account” that is unsatisfactory in the Theaetetus. See Fine (1979), Chappell (2009, sec 8) and
Burnyeat (1990, 235–8) for some discussion. Fine (2004, 70–1) argues that Plato’s definition covers
knowledge rather than understanding or science. It is also debated whether the definition covers
propositional knowledge, objectual knowledge, or both: the sun, virtue and Theaetetus are given
as examples of things known. White (1976, 176ff), Nehamas (1984) and Kaplan (1985, 352) object to
comparisons with the justified true belief analysis on that basis. See Fine (1979, 366–7; 2004, 48–9)
for a rejoinder.
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“Account” is usually glossed as an “explanation of why something is so”. In-
sofar as one cannot explain why something is so without it being so, accounts
are truth-entailing.56 It is open whether Plato took having an account to be
discernible.57 Thus it is open whether Plato’s view is an instance of Classical
Infallibilism.
Kant defines knowledge as “assent [that] is both subjectively and objec-
tively sufficient”.58 That is spelled out in Kant’s lectures on logic as “assent
based on a ground of cognition that is objectively as well as subjectively suf-
ficient” (AA 9:70, Kant, 1992, 574). One may argue that Kant calls a ground
“subjectively sufficient” just if it is discernible.59 One may also argue that Kant
calls a ground “objectively sufficient” only if it is truth-entailing.60 Kant’s def-
56Thanks to John Hawthorne here. Fine (2004, 67, 72) argues that Plato’s notion of “account” is
demanding and that “beliefs with an account” cannot be based on any falsehood, but she leaves
open whether some such beliefs are false.
57Fine (2004, 66) tentatively suggests that Plato’s notion of account is internalist.
58A822/B850, Kant (1998, 684). For simplicity I replace Guyer’s literal rendering of Fürwahrhal-
ten as “taking something to be true” by “assent” (as does Chignell, 2007b, 35). “Assent” is broader
than belief—it includes suppositions, for instance (Chignell, 2007a, 37). However, “subjectively
sufficient” assent involves a degree of conviction that would make it count as belief by contem-
porary standards. The word for “knowledge” here is Wissen. Most of the Critique of Pure Reason
is concerned with Erkenntnis, which Guyer translates as “cognition”. In German Erkenntnis is a
“knowledge”-like term: it derives from the verb for objectual knowledge (kennen) and typically
means “recognition”, “realization” or “discovery”. Hence it is tempting to identify Kant’s Erken-
ntnis / Wissen pair with the traditional distinction between cognitio and scientia. Thus Kemp Smith
translated Erkenntnis as “knowledge” (see also Dicker, 2004, xii). The temptation must be resisted,
however. Kant’s Erkenntnis includes representations that are false (A58/B83) and ideas of reason,
such as the immortality of the soul, that lie beyond what can be known (A3/B6, A320/B376-77).
Thus Erkenntnis is not plausibly understood as a notion of knowledge, ordinary or otherwise.
Rather, Kant seems to use it for any mental state that can be evaluated as true or false (or more
broadly, correct or incorrect) (A58/B83, A320/B376-77). Wissen is Kant’s notion of knowledge. So,
somewhat surprisingly, the primary object of Kant’s first Critique is not the possibility of knowl-
edge but the possibility of thought. The switch from the epistemological to the semantic is char-
acteristic of Idealist views. Note that Kant does have a knowledge / science pair: Wissen / Wis-
senschaft (distinguished at A832/B860).
59Chignell (2007b, 45) says that a ground of one’s assent is “subjectively sufficient” just if on re-
flection, one would cite it as one’s sufficient objective ground. Thus if g is a subjectively sufficient
ground of your belief, then if you were attentive enough, you would believe that your belief is
based on g. This leaves open whether, if you were attentive enough and your belief was not based
on g, you could think that it was. But while Kant clearly thinks that the grounds of our judgement
are not immediately transparent to us, he does seem to think that sufficient reflection would al-
low one to tell what they are (see e.g. AA 9:76, Kant, 1992, 579). Relatedly, Chignell (2007b, 41–2)
discusses whether “grounds” are only internal psychological states or include external states as
well. There is textual evidence both ways. Interestingly for us, Chignell’s conclusion is that ex-
ternal facts could be included insofar as they are discernible: “[. . . ] in order to know something a
subject must be able to cite or pick out what she takes to be her objective grounds. As long as that
is possible with respect to the relevant external states or objects, then perhaps we can allow them
to count as objective grounds as well”. This chimes in with the New Story, according to which if
Classical Infallibilists assign a special epistemological role to internal states, that is because they
are discernible, not because they are internal (fn. 17 above).
60Chignell (2007b, 42) denies it. He takes objective sufficiency to consist in sufficiently high ob-
jective probability. That clashes with Kant’s definition of probability as “assent based on insuf-
ficient grounds” (AA 9:80, Kant, 1992, 583). As Chignell (2007b, 60n19, 61n31) concedes, Kant
normally associates sufficient grounds with “certainty”. So Chignell should rather say that Kant’s
“certainty” is not truth-entailing. However, Kant distinguishes “I am certain” from “the object is
certain” and uses the latter for objectively sufficient grounds (A822/B850, AA 9:72). While the
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inition would otherwise fail to secure the claim that knowledge entails truth.61
Nothing more is required.62 Thus it is at least open whether Kant’s view is an
instance of Classical Infallibilism. As we see below, the reading also fits well
with Kant’s treatment of external-world scepticism.
4.4 Idealist Dogmatism
A striking feature of Western philosophy from the eighteenth to mid-twentieth
century is the predominance of Idealist views. What the New Story suggests
is that Idealism was an attempt to rescue Dogmatism in a Classical Infallibilist
framework. For a variety of reasons, sceptical arguments came to the fore again
in modern times. Philosophers increasingly doubted that there were any dis-
cernible class of true sense-impressions. The natural conclusion for Classical
Infallibilists is Scepticism—and many embraced it, as we will see. However,
impressions were taken to be discernible marks at least of their own presence.
Thus if ordinary objects—trees, horses and the like—were made out of impres-
sions, then perhaps we had discernible mark of truths for our ordinary beliefs
after all. Thus the epistemological troubles of Classical Infallibilism motivated
the revisionary metaphysics of Idealism.
personal construction is compatible with falsehood, the impersonal one is not: “it is not raining
and it is certain that it rains” is contradictory. If Kant departed from ordinary and philosophical
usage so much as to call objectively “certain” things that are false it is surprising that he never
mentioned it. Now Chignell’s (2007b, 42) claim that Kant’s objectively sufficient grounds are not
truth-entailing rests on two passages of Kant’s lectures on logic in which it is said that when one’s
grounds are objectively sufficient, there may still be grounds for the opposite (AA 9:72, Kant, 1992,
576; AA 24:160, Kant, 1992, 126). But the fact that sufficient grounds may coexist with grounds
for the opposite does not entail that there are sufficient objective grounds for false claims. Like
Descartes, Kant may have thought that having a discernible mark of truth for something is com-
patible with having (insufficient) grounds for doubting it. Note in particular that a ground’s being
truth-entailing and discernible does not entail that it is discernible or antecedently known that the
ground is truth-entailing. Thus a subject with objectively sufficient grounds may doubt that they
are objectively sufficient. A further discussion of these issues would require a close examination
of Kant’s discussion of doubt, how it is removed, and how to ascertain whether one’s grounds of
assent are objective or subjective (e.g. AA: 9:83, 9:73). For present purposes it is enough to show
that a Classical Infallibilist reading of Kant is a live option.
61Thus Chignell (2007a, 330), denying that objective sufficiency is truth-entailing, supplements
the definition with a truth clause and suggests that Kant, “operating in the Platonic tradition”,
has left it implicit. The New Story casts doubt on the existence of such a tradition. While in
the Critique Kant is admittedly brief on knowledge and related concepts (“I will not pause for
the exposition of such readily grasped concepts”, A822/B850), it is worth noting that his much
more detailed lectures on logic give the very same definition, without truth clause (quoted above).
Earlier lectures (Blomberg’s notes) give the following instead: “To know is to judge something
and hold it to be true with certainty.” (AA 24:148). Again, no truth clause is added. The textbook
Kant was relying on (G.F. Meier’s Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, §§155-167) does not does not
provide the alleged implicit clause either—it does not define Wissen at all. If so it would be peculiar
for Kant to leave his students in the dark about it.
62In particular, as Chignell (2007b, 49) stresses, “some of the facts on which an assent’s objective
sufficiency supervenes—and in particular facts about its objective probability—will typically be
inaccessible to a normal subject.” Knowledge requires an objectively sufficient ground, not that
it be discernible or antecedently known that that ground is objectively sufficient. That fits with
the Classical Infallibilist picture, on which knowledge requires discernible marks that are in fact
truth-entailing, not that one discerns or antecedently knows that the marks are truth-entailing.
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Locke flirted with Idealism in his reply to scepticism. In case his main an-
swer was not granted he proposed an alternative. Even if what he calls “fire”
turns out to be an idea in him, it is no less a cause (or temporal predecessor)
of pain, and knowing that is all that matters.63 The assumption is that even if
he lacks discernible marks of truth about the existence of fire, he has at least
discernible marks of truths for the existence of sensations of fire and what fol-
lows from them. For—his thought may be—the sensations play the role of
discernible marks of their own presence. The further step, taken by Berkeley
and subsequent Idealists, was to claim that “fire” in fact refers to these sensa-
tions.64 Thus we may hope to have discernible marks of the presence of fire
after all.
The Classical Infallibilist motivation is evident in Berkeley and Kant. Berke-
ley grants the sceptical claim that we have no discernible mark of truths for the
existence of unperceived bodies.65 In line with Classical Infallibilism, he con-
cludes that we do not know that there are such things. He claims, however,
that we do know our ideas and what they necessary entail.66 He avoids out-
right scepticism by claiming that ordinary things like apples are collections of
ideas.67
Kant’s “refutation of Idealism” (B274–9) is meant to show that the existence
of things in space is entailed by our “inner experience”. As with Descartes,
I doubt that Kant thought that nobody knew that there were things in space
before they had such a proof. But Kant plausibly took the conclusion of the
proof—the alleged entailment—to be a requirement on our having knowledge
63Locke (1975, IV, 2, §14): “But yet if [one who argues that a dream may produce the same idea]
be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing
but a dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as fire actually exists
without us: I answer, That we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application
of certain objects to us, whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses; this
certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know
or to be.” The reply is pragmatic rather than Idealist.
64See Berkeley ( 57, §1) “Thus, for example a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence
having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple.
Other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things–which as
they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.”
65Berkeley ( 57, §18): “But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without
the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend
there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what
happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be
affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing without resembling them”.
66See Berkeley ( 57, §18): “Either we must know [the existence of unperceived bodies] by sense or
by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge ONLY OF OUR SENSATIONS, ideas,
or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not
inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived.”
The rest of the paragraph, quoted above, shows that Berkeley assumes that something is known
by reason only if it is entailed by the existence of our ideas. Berkeley takes this to include the
immortality of souls, the existence of other minds and the existence of God.
67See e.g. Berkeley ( 57, §1), quoted fn. 64 above.
22
of things in space.68 If the proof is successful, then our “inner experience”—
which he presumably takes to be discernible—is a mark of the existence of
things in space. In order to secure it, however, Kant claims that that “things in
space” are just sensations with a spatial “form”.69
The Infallibilist motivation of Idealism—and its later cousin, Verificationism—
could be followed up to the mid-twentieth century. For instance, what al-
lows Moore to hope that wakeful experiences are “logically incompatible” with
dreaming is his project of reducing ordinary objects to sense-data. Here we will
simply note a final sign of that motivation: the almost complete disappearance
of Idealism after the fall Classical Infallibilism.
4.5 Probabilist Scepticism
Throughout history we find philosophers who acknowledge the lack of dis-
cernible marks of truth while overtly rejecting Scepticism. They are not coun-
terexamples to the New Story. They are Probabilist Sceptics. Their view has
Hellenistic origins as well.
In reply to the Dogmatic objection that life without assent is impossible,
Carneades—at least dialectically—argued that one could be guided by convinc-
ing impressions. Translated by Cicero as probabile (“acceptable”, “that can be
approved”), the notion was destined to have lasting influence. It is worth quot-
ing the passage that sets it out in full:
Of the apparently true impressions, one kind is dim, e.g. in the case
of those whose apprehension of something is confused and not dis-
tinct, owing to the smallness of the thing observed or the length of
distance or even the weakness of their vision; the other kind, along
with appearing true, is additionally characterised by the intensity
of its appearing true. [. . . ] the impression which appears true and
fully manifests itself is the criterion of truth according to Carneades
and his followers. As the criterion, it has a considerable breadth,
and by admitting of degrees, it includes some impressions which
are more convincing and striking in their form than others. [. . . ]
68Kant says that the Idealist’s claim is that the existence of things outside us is “doubtful” or
“false” (B274). Since he takes knowledge to require certainty (A822/B850) and (arguably) truth,
he takes the Idealist view to entail that we lack knowledge of things in space. Hence he takes the
Idealist view to deny that we satisfy some necessary condition on knowledge, and he plausibly
takes the conclusion of his refutation to state that we do satisfy that condition.
69Kant undoubtedly took his view to allow a distinction between subjective space, in which sen-
sations are received, and objective space, in which the “understanding” somehow locates them.
What is important to him—and what he takes to distinguish him from Berkeley—is that his Refuta-
tion proves the existence of things in objective space. But he takes objective space to be somehow a
“form” of our sensations as well. Kant’s doctrine is intricate; what matters for our purposes is only
that he assumed that knowledge of things in space had to satisfy Classical Infallibilist standards,
which is plausibly one of the motivations for his brand of Idealism.
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Hence the criterion will be the impression which appears true—also
called ’convincing’ by the Academics—but there are times when it
actually turns out false, so that it is necessary actually to use the im-
pression which is common on occasion to truth and falsehood. Yet
the rare occurrence of this one, I mean the impression which coun-
terfeits the truth [i.e., the second], is not a reason for distrusting the
impression [i.e. the third] which tells the truth for the most part.
For both judgements and actions, as it turns out, are regulated by
what holds for the most part. (LS 69D)
Convincing impressions are discernible: they contrast with “confused” and
“indistinct” ones, they have an “intensity of appearing true” and they “man-
ifest themselves”. But they are not truth-entailing. They are merely reliable:
they are true “for the most part”—that is, only most of them are true. Both
dimensions admit of degrees. We may call indication of truth a property of a
belief such that most beliefs who have it are true. Carneades’s suggestion is
that action could be guided by a discernible indication of truth.
Importantly, Carneades did not think that indications of truth (perhaps in
conjunction with truth) are enough for knowledge (e.g. LS 69F). Thus he did
not challenge Classical Infallibilism. Rather, he targeted the Stoics’ assumption
that one should act only on the basis of what one knows.70 His successor Philo
of Larissa appears to have taken a step further and targeted the widely shared
Hellenistic view that one should believe only what one knows.71 He held that
convincing impressions would justify some form of assent, opinion.72
Carneades’s convincing is of course not the modern quantified notion of
probability. But its core features are those later philosophers commonly asso-
70See LS 69A. The Stoic assumption has been revived in the contemporary context by Unger
(1975, chap. 5). Burnyeat (npub) argues that Carneades’s rejoinder to Stoics is not that convincing
impressions justify actions, but rather than their fallibility fails to justify suspension.
71Before Philo, and even after him, few challenged Sceptics on the idea that if nothing was
known, nothing should be “assented” to. Moreover, I suspect that even within the post-Philo
tradition it was held that there is a kind of “assent” (typically, subjective certainty) reserved to
what was known. The idea that beliefs of any type can be equally justified when one knows as
when one does not is a contemporary one. In recent years the traditional view that one should
believe only what one knows has been revived by Unger (1975, chap. 5), Williamson (2000, 47;
2007), Sutton (2007), Haddock (2010), Littlejohn (2014).
72“[. . . ] the wise man will assent to what is incognitive, i.e. will opine, but in such a way that he
realizes that he is opining and knows that there is nothing which can be grasped and cognized.”
(LS 69K) That is the (looser) sense in which convincing impressions are said to be “criteria of truth”
above. Philo (via his main pupil Antiochus, whose lectures Cicero attended) is one of our main
sources and he was keen to present his own views as continuous with those of Carneades. Thus
while some texts say that Carneades called convincing impressions “criteria of truths” and allowed
forming opinion on their basis, a number of commentators think that Carneades restricted them to
action-guidance, did not call them “criteria” and only put forward the view dialectically, as a way
to show that lack of knowledge did not entail that no action was justified (Long and Sedley, 448–9
and Schofield, 1999, 334–8). At any rate, it is clear enough that Philo did relax Academic Scepticism
enough to allow the formation of “probable” opinions. See Long and Sedley (1987, 455–60) and
Schofield (1999) for further discussion.
24
ciate with epistemic notions of the “probable”. First, it somehow invites assent:
it makes something “appear true”. Second, it is discernible. On Carneades’s
view the two are conjoined: the convincing is discernible because it is a certain
way of appearing true. Third, it is not truth-entailing but it is reliable. Fourth,
it comes in degrees. These features can be found in later notions of “probabil-
ity”, sometimes—but not always—spelled out in terms of mathematical prob-
ability.73 Thus “Probabilism” is not a wholly bad name for a view inspired by
Carneades.74 The same features may be found in the contemporary internal-
ist notion of (epistemic) “justification”, when that term is used to denote not
simply the normative status of being justified but some discernible indication of
truth in virtue of which a belief has that status (“one’s reasons”, “grounds” or
“evidence”).
Philosophers who adopt Carneades’s “criterion” may emphatically deny
that they are Sceptics because they deny that we ought to suspend judgement.
But they are Sceptics in the sense of denying that we know. Locke is a prime
example. He distinguishes the certain, which is the province of knowledge,
from the merely probable, which falls short of knowledge.75 The scope of the
former is severely limited: ideas and conceptual truths, the existence of God
and the existence of particular things that we currently perceive.76 In the latter,
however, opinion is allowed. As with Carneades, “probability” is defined in
terms of discernible indication of truth—though Locke hesitates on whether
the indication’s reliability should be real or apparent.77 Probabilist Scepticism
is also manifest in the first philosophers to call themselves “fallibilists”, namely
Pierce and Popper.78
73See e.g. Kant (AA 9:82) who insists that not all probability can be given a mathematical repre-
sentation.
74See Burnyeat (npub) and Schofield (1999, 350) for discussion. It is potentially misleading to
call Carneades himself a “probabilist” because (a) he puts a view forward dialectically, but does
endorse it and (b) the view he puts forward is not we ought to follow chances, but rather than there
is no reason not to. But Philo turned Carneades’s view into a non-dialectical, normative one. In a
landmark study Hacking (1975, 18–38) argued that pre-modern notions of “probability” lacked the
dimension of evidential support. The claim has since been overturned; see Franklin (2001, 373).
75Locke (1975 IV, 3 §14): “the highest probability amounts not to certainty, without which there
can be no true knowledge”.
76Locke (1975, IV, 3, §1, §5, §9–14, §21); “our ignorance is great” (§22).
77Locke, 1975, IV, 15, §1: “probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or
disagreement [between two ideas] by the intervention of proofs, whose connexion is not constant
and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and
is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary.”
The text leaves open whether probability involves a connexion that “is” or “appears” for the most
part to be so.
78Peirce introduced the term “fallibilism” and defined it as the doctrine “that we can never be
sure of anything” or “that we cannot attain absolute certainty concerning matters of fact” (Peirce,
1950, 58–9). He took that to involve the rejection of the aim of knowledge: “there will remain over
no relic of the good old tenth-century infallibilism, except that of the infallible scientists, under
which head I include [. . . ] all those respectable and cultivated persons who, having acquired
their notions of science from reading, and not from research, have the idea that “science” means
knowledge, while the truth is, it is a misnomer applied to the pursuit of those who are devoured
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4.6 Induction and Infallibilism
Surely, one may think, historical philosophers were aware that most ordinary
beliefs are based on inductive inference. So, if Classical Infallibilism is true,
then historical philosophers must have been either widely sceptical or strangely
convinced that inductive inference was infallible. But both seem absurd.
As surprising as it may seem to contemporary epistemologists, that is ex-
actly what we find. Many philosophers had an extremely restricted view of
what we know, excluding e.g. knowledge of the future, or knowledge acquired
by testimony, or almost all perceptual knowledge. Locke is a case in point.
Others had infallibilist views about inductive inference. I think that could be
argued about Ancient and Medieval accounts of inductive inference in terms of
the acquisition of “pre-notions” (either by observation or divine illumination).
But I will simply mention one striking modern instance. In his System of Logic,
Book 3, Mill aims at giving conditions for “correct” induction. He writes:
“Some [inductions], we know, which were believed for centuries
to be correct, were nevertheless incorrect. That all swans are white,
cannot have been a good induction, since the conclusion has turned
out erroneous.”
By contraposition, if an induction is “good”, its conclusion is not erroneous.
Undoubtedly, Mill thought that the validity of induction depended on an ob-
jective, substantial feature of our world: its “uniformity”. And unlike Kant,
it did not think that the uniformity of the world was somehow demonstrable.
But he appeared to think that, given that uniformity, some inductive methods
are truth-entailing.
4.7 Hard cases: Autrecourt, Buridan, Reid, Ramsey
Nicholas of Autrecourt (c. 1295–1369) famously argued that the scope of the
“evident” is restricted to what cannot logically be false: analytical claims and
maybe a restricted class of impressions.79 His arguments are consistent with a
by a desire to find things out” (Peirce, 1950, 3). Popper (1972, 228) calls himself “fallibilist” as
well. He does talk about “scientific knowledge”, which he claims to be in continuity with ordinary
knowledge and to be the object of traditional epistemology—Plato, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Mill
and Russell (Popper, 1959/2002, xxi–ii). However, he allows “knowledge” to be falsified, hence
false. Whether or not that is a legitimate extension of “know”, it is closer to Carneades’s notion of
probable opinion than to historical and contemporary notions of knowledge.
79On Autrecourt’s epistemology see Zupko (1993, 193–5), Thijssen (2000) and Grellard (2005,
2010). In his First Letter to Bernard of Arezzo he argues that if, as Arezzo contains, impressions are
distinct from their objects, then “every impression we have of the existence of objects outside of
our minds can be false” (3, Klima, 2007, 134). However in his Exigit ordo he claims that “apparences
(in the strict sense) are not [false]” and he takes wakeful appearances to be “different in kind” from
ones in dreams (see Grellard, 2010, 130-1). So his claim that every impression can be false may have
been conditional on premisses he rejected.
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Classical Infallibilist account of the “evident”. However, he appeared to have
also held that knowledge extends beyond the “evident” to the “probable”.80
In doing so, he appears to reject Classical Infallibilism. He would thus be a
counterexample to the bold hypothesis. It is worth noting, however, that his
views were widely taken to entail skepticism, because it was widely assumed
that knowledge required “evidentness”. That is consistent with the hypothesis
that most of his contemporaries endorsed Classical Infallibilism.
John Buridan (c. 1295–1363) was one of those who thought that Autrecourt’s
arguments would lead to scepticism. However his own epistemology has a
fallibilist flavour too.81 There are two reasons for this. First, he allows a stan-
dard of “evidentness” that is not truth-entailing but sufficient for moral con-
duct. His example is that of a magistrate who, after diligent investigation, “acts
well and meritoriously” in hanging an innocent. The notion prefigures that of
“moral certainty” and the legal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”.82 Un-
fortunately, it is not clear whether he counts that type of “evidentness” as a
“certainty” and as sufficient for knowledge.83 He may be a Probabilistic Scep-
tic on moral affairs. Second, Buridan grants that God could make any sense-
impression false but allows knowledge on the basis of “evidentness” that en-
tails the truth conditional on nature following its course.84 Now if Buridan takes
80See Grellard (2010, 132–6).
81See Zupko (1993), Klima (2009, 237–45), Pasnau (2010a, 30–7), Karger (2010, 221–3). Buri-
dan’s discussion is framed in terms of scientia but it covers ordinary knowledge, e.g. knowing that
Socrates is running or that the sun is bright (Summulae de Dialectica, bk. 8, ch. 4, sec. 4, Klima, 2007,
146).
82Quaestiones in Aristotelis Metaphysicam, Bk. 2 q. 1, trans. Klima (2007, 146): “there is an even
weaker kind of evidentness that suffices for acting morally well, namely, when someone, hav-
ing seen and investigated all relevant facts and circumstances that man can diligently investigate,
makes a judgement in accordance with these circumstances, then his judgement will be evident
with the sort of evidentness that suffices for acting morally well, even if the judgement is false, be-
cause of some insurmountable ignorance of some circumstance. For example, it would be possible
for a magistrate to act well and meritoriously in hanging a holy man because from testimonies and
other legal evidence it sufficiently appeared to him concerning this good man that he was an evil
murderer.” See (Pasnau, 2010a, 33 and n12) on the legacy of the notion.
83Pasnau (2010a, 36) argues that the question would be irrelevant to Buridan and scholastic
philosophers: “the question of whether it is certain enough to count as knowledge is not the
scholastic question. For them, as I have been stressing, epistemic states occur along a contin-
uum without sharp breaks, and there is accordingly little point in worrying about whether a given
context is now so far from the ideal that it should no longer count as scientia.” I agree with much
of Pasnau’s picture (see below) but not with that part. Buridan’s scale of epistemic states is not a
continuum. It has well-defined cut-off points: the supernaturally unfalsifiable, the naturally unfal-
sifiable, the naturally falsifiable. He also takes seriously the question how far scientia applies: he
insists that when he sees Socrates running, it is correct to say that he knows, and not merely opines,
that Socrates is running (Summulae de Dialectica, bk. 8, ch. 4, sec. 4, Klima, 2007, 149). Moreover, he
stresses a sharp difference between knowledge and opinion: the former requires truth, the second
does not. Since he took the “moral” kind of evidentness to be compatible with falsehood, the issue
whether it could yield something properly called “knowledge” would have been worth raising. I
suspect he did not do so because he thought the answer was obviously negative.
84Summulae de Dialectica, bk. 8, ch. 4, sec. 4: “Another [type of evidentness] is such that in ac-
cordance with it the cognitive power is compelled either by its own nature [or by some evident
argument] to assent to a truth or a true proposition that cannot be falsified naturally, although it
could be falsified supernaturally. And this is what is required for natural science.” (Klima, 2007,
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natural necessity to entail truth, that is a variant of Classical Infallibilism with
a restricted notion of necessity. If, however, natural necessity does not entail
truth—because miracles happen—then he is indeed rejecting Classical Infalli-
bilism. One could even argue that he endorses a version of the Justified True
Belief analysis.85 Note, however, that even on that reading Buridan’s view is
close to Dogmatic Classical Infallibilism. For he appears to think that, super-
natural scenarios aside, it is always possible to tell on reflection whether one’s
senses are deceived.86
Reid is commonly taken to defend a “fallibilist” conception of knowledge,
for he allows knowledge of external objects through perception unaided by rea-
son even while recognising that perception is fallible.87 A detailed discussion
of Reid is more than I can offer here. But I would like to stress three points that
are crucial in assessing whether Reid is a counterexample to the New Story.
First, we should distinguish source infallibilism from Classical Infallibilism. Our
paradigm Infallibilists, Stoics, were “fallibilists” in a sense: unlike Epicurus,
they granted that senses are fallible. Thus like Reid, they “did not require that
sources of knowledge be infallible” (Greco, 1995, 294). But they were Classical
Infallibilists, because they thought that these sources provide us with knowl-
edge only when they provide us with a discernible mark of truth. Thus we
should ask whether Reid thought it possible for a belief to constitute knowl-
edge without any of its discernible features entailing its truth. Second, as with
the Stoics, it is important to recall that discernibility does not require that one
can introspect one’s impressions; it merely requires that a sufficiently attentive
subject believes that they have an impression of the right kind just when they
149). The context indicates that “cannot be falsified naturally” here qualifies the assent, not merely
the proposition. (Previous paragraphs apply the supernaturally vs. naturally falsifiable distinction
to “certainty on the part of the proposition”, i.e. truth and necessity; this paragraph analogously
extend the distinction to “evidentness”. See Klima, 2009, 244 who reads the passage as concerning
the reliability of our cognitive faculties.)
85To see this we need to unpack Buridan’s idiosyncratic terminology. He takes “certainty” to
involve two things, one on the side of the proposition, one one the side of the subject. The former
is said to be “firmness of truth” (metaphysical or natural necessity) in Quaestiones in Aristotelis
Metaphysicam, Bk. 2 q. 1 (Klima, 2007, 145) but simply “truth” in the Summulae de Dialectica, bk. 8,
ch. 4, sec. 4 (Klima, 2007, 147). The latter is “firmness of assent”, which we would call subjective
certainty. Firm assent further divides into that without “evidentness” (orthodox faith, the wilful
errors of heretics, belief based on sophisms) and that “with evidentness”. Now in Summulae de
Dialectica, ibid., Buridan defines knowledge as “assent with certainty and evidentness” (Klima,
2007, 146). Given the foregoing that is equivalent to: firm assent (i.e., belief) that is true and with
evidentness. If evidentness is discernible but does not entail truth that is a version of the Justified
True Belief view. See Karger (2010, 221–3) for a comparable reading.
86“In response to [the argument about the deceptiveness of the senses] I say that if the senses are
naturally deceived, then the intellect has to investigate whether there are people there or not, and
it has to correct the judgements of illusion” (Questions on Metaphysics, Bk. 2 q. 1, Klima, 2007, 146).
See however Zupko (1993, 210) for a weaker reading of Buridan’s claim that the intellect has the
power to correct the error of the senses.
87Greco (1995, 294). However, Sosa (2009, 61) takes some of Reid’s principles to be infallibilist.
He takes them to be false and discusses a revised, fallibilist reading of Reid’s view.
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do.88 Thus Reid may both reject the Lockean Doctrine of Ideas and yet take
sense-impressions to be discernible. Third, as with Mill and Buridan, it is cru-
cial to ask whether Reid is operating with a restricted notion of necessity. He
may merely be requiring that given laws of nature, suitable sense-impressions
entail their truth.
An indisputable counterexample to the hypothesis is Ramsey (1931). Ram-
sey takes inductive inference to be a source of knowledge and he clearly ac-
knowledges that it is not truth-preserving but merely “reliable”, that is, it only
leads to true opinion “on the whole”. There is no indication that, like Mill, he
takes some discernible subclass of inductive inferences to be truth-preserving.
Hence he rejects Classical Infallibilism. Significantly, however, Ramsey’s bril-
liant anticipation had little influence in its time.
4.8 Alternatives to the New Story
Two other broad pictures of the history of epistemology have been recently
defended. Antognazza (2015, 167–71) also argues that the Justified True Be-
lief analysis is a twentieth century invention and that there is nevertheless a
traditional conception of knowledge. On her view the tradition takes knowl-
edge to be “a primitive perception or an irreducible mental ‘seeing’ what is the
case; [. . . ] a primitive presence of a fact to the mind (or to the senses) in which
there is no ‘gap’ between knower and known” (169). The state in question is
incompatible with, and irreducible to, belief. But it involves “thinking with
assent” (assent, for short), a genus of which knowledge and belief are species.
Since presence of the fact that p entails that p is so, being made in presence of
the fact to the mind is a truth-entailing property of assents. So as in the New
Story, tradition says that knowing entails being in some acceptance-like state
with a truth-entailing property. Her picture differs on three counts, however.
First, the acceptance-like state is assent rather than belief. It is not clear to me
whether the difference is more than verbal.89 Second, the property in ques-
tion is “being made in presence of the fact to the mind”. It is not clear to me
whether that is incompatible with knowledge of the future, the distant or the
past. Third, she leaves open whether the presence of a fact to the mind is dis-
cernible in my sense. If it is not it is not clear why past philosophers were
worried about dreams, fakes and the like. If, for instance, the presence of a fact
to the mind simply consisted in assent caused by the corresponding fact, dreams
88See fns. 33 and 39 above.
89Supplement Classical Infallibilism with opinion, defined as belief that lacks a discernible mark
of truth. “Opinion” and knowledge are species of “belief” in Classical Infallibilism just as “belief”
and knowledge are species of “assent” in Antognazza’s view of the traditional conception.
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and the like would do nothing to show that no facts are present to the mind.90
Pasnau’s (2010b; 2010a; 2013) picture is that traditional and contemporary
epistemology pursue different projects. With the possible exception of Plato,
Western philosophers were not interested in providing an analysis of knowl-
edge. They were interested in more specific cognitive phenomena such as per-
ception or imagination (Pasnau, 2013, 990). But more importantly, they were
interested in setting out an epistemic ideal: the best knowledge-like state hu-
mans could aspire to (Pasnau, 2013, 994). Aristotle and Descartes are offered
as illustration: Aristotle’s episte¯me¯ and Descartes’s scientia are ideals for hu-
man theoretical achievement, not accounts of ordinary knowledge (Pasnau,
2013, 990–6; Pasnau, 2013, 1000–1). Ideal-theoretic epistemology emphasizes
a scale of distance from the ideal and the question of which grade is suitable
for what purposes, rather than the putative threshold between knowledge and
non-knowledge and the question whether we cross it. The idea is illustrated by
grades of certainty in medieval epistemology (Pasnau, 2010a, 36; 2013, 1014–
15).
Pasnau’s central insight seems to me correct: many historical philosophers
are better understood as laying out an ideal for systematic theoretical inquiry.
Indeed, that is essential secure the New Story’s claim that philosophers took
knowledge to require nothing more than discernible marks of truth—for Descartes’s
scientia, for instance, does require more than a discernible mark of truth. How-
ever, Pasnau’s picture seems to me partial in three ways. First, it omits in-
tense debates over whether we know. What Stoics and Sceptics mainly argued
about was not what the epistemic ideal was or whether it was reachable but
whether we knew anything.91 Indeed, Pasnau (2013, 1015) points out that
ideal-theoretic epistemology makes sceptical worries much less pressing than
knowledge-centred epistemology does. Thus his picture makes it puzzling that
sceptical views were taken much more seriously in history than they are now.92
The New Story, by contrast, explains it by ascribing historical philosophers a
90See sec. 5 below on the Crude Causal theory. Now dreams and the like are cases of assent
in the absence of fact. So the metaphysical possibility of dreams would establish the metaphysical
possibility of assent without knowing. But that is something that Dogmatists happily grant. The
epistemic possibility of dreams would show that it is epistemically possible that we do not know. If
epistemic possibility entails lack of knowledge then we do not know whether we know. So Crude
Causal theorists would at most take dreams and the like to undermine second-order knowledge.
Even then, they may quickly dispell the worry by applying their theory at higher order. Dreams
and the like do nothing to show that no assent that one knows is caused by the corresponding fact.
91Examples could be multiplied. When late medieval authors debated over “whether, when I
clearly see Socrates running, I know that he is running or I merely opine this” (Buridan, Sum-
mulae de Dialectica, bk. 8, ch. 4, sec. 4, Klima, 2007, 149), there were not discussing whether such
cases satisfy the ideal requirements of Aristotelian science. When Berkeley argues that we cannot
have knowledge of unperceived bodies, he is not merely denying that we lack an ideal theoretical
discipline for them.
92As Pasnau (2013, 1015n45) reports, the 2009 Philpapers survey suggests that a mere 3% of phi-
losophy professors lean toward external-world scepticism.
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view that does lead to scepticism. Second, the picture omits the fact that the
epistemic ideal was typically defined in terms of knowledge. Aristotle defines sci-
ence (or understanding, episte¯me¯) as knowledge (gigno¯skein) of why something
is so and could not be otherwise than it is.93 Stoics define science (episte¯me¯)
as body of knowledge (cognition, katale¯psis) rich enough to withstand objec-
tions. Descartes defines science (scientia) in terms of clear and distinct percep-
tion, which is his account of (basic) knowledge (cognitio).94 Far from defining
the ordinary notion of knowledge as a lesser form of the epistemic ideal, these
philosophers defined the epistemic ideal in terms of knowledge. Third, it omits
the fact that many historical philosophers had a theory of knowledge. We have
seen that the Stoics had one and we have reviewed evidence for a similar the-
ory across history. Granted, Pasnau is right that there was little discussion of
what knowledge is—especially in comparison to how much they debated the
proper form and method of science and whether we knew anything. But that
is not so surprising if, as the New Story holds, they widely agreed over what
knowledge is. The question became a topic of debate only when Classical In-
fallibilism collapsed.
4.9 Guidelines for a history of epistemology
The New Story’s bold hypothesis is worth exploring further. Here are some
guidelines for doing so. First, one should ask whether a candidate notion is
that of knowledge. Kant’s Erkenntnis is less; Descartes’s scientia is more.95 Use-
ful clues are whether the notion entails truth and whether it is what we prima
facie seem to have in some paradigmatic cases—“when I clearly see Socrates
running”, to take Buridan’s example. Second, one should ask whether knowl-
edge is taken to require some truth-entailing property in addition to truth it-
self. A useful clue is whether truth figures as an independent condition. Third,
one should ask whether the property in question is required to be discernible.
Clues can be found in claims that error can be avoided and in the treatment of
sceptical scenarios. Fourth, one should carefully distinguish the requirement
of having a discernible mark of truth from that of antecedently knowing that a
mark is a mark of truth. The fact that a philosopher rejects the latter is not suf-
ficient to show that they are “fallibilist” or “externalist” in the contemporary
sense. Fifth, one should be careful in interpreting a philosopher’s insistence
on the proper functioning of faculties or on nature following its normal course.
Again, these are not indications that they are “fallibilist” or “externalist” in the
contemporary sense, for they may have taken proper functioning to deliver
93Posterior Analytics, 71b10. See Barnes (1993, 89–92).
94See DeRose (1992b, sec. B) for a proposal along these lines.
95On Kant see fn. 58 above.
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discernible marks of truth, or they may have been operating with a restricted
notion of necessity. Finally, one should not assume that it was obvious to past
philosophers that no discernible property of beliefs is truth-entailing.
5 The fall of Classical Infallibilism
Classical Infallibilism does not face standard Gettier-style counterexamples. In
standard Gettier-style counterexamples it is clear that whatever is discernible
to the subject fails to entail truth; so Classical Infallibilists would have no trou-
ble in denying that the subject knows (see sec. 1 above). If Classical Infallibilists
face Gettier counterexamples, they are of a more subtle and controversial kind
(Williamson, 2013). Suppose that clearly perceiving is discernible and truth-
entailing. Still, there will plausibly be a series of barely different cases rang-
ing from clear to non-clear perception. If the first non-clear perception case in
one such series is one of error, then the last clear case is arguably not one of
knowledge—for it is one in which could easily have been mistaken. Thus the
truth-entailing condition is too weak; one should require a property that en-
sures truth at closes cases as well. Be that as it may, that kind of case is subtle
and controversial enough for it not to be surprising that it was not raised by
past philosophers. Thus the New Story explains why the Gettier problem was
not raised earlier.
Classical Infallibilism does lead to Scepticism, however. Few, if any, of our
beliefs bear discernible marks of truth. That is so even on extreme restrictions
of necessity and Idealist reconstructions. If our beliefs are wholly about sense-
data, past experiences still fail to entail future ones, so we do not have dis-
cernible marks of the unobserved. If we restrict the possible to the actual, a
property of a belief is discernible only if for all beliefs that have it, one actually
believes that they have it. Thus only extremely reflective subjects know any-
thing. Moreover, if marks are grouped into fairly broad kinds (see sec. 2), so
that, for instance, having a clear visual impression that p counts as truth-entailing
only if in general having a clear visual impression is truth-entailing, few marks
will be truth-entailing. For in actuality alone some people have had clear vi-
sual impressions of something false.
The stark implications of Classical Infallibilism are visible in two influential
books of the first half of the twentieth century. C.I. Lewis (1929) holds that we
have a wealth of empirical knowledge. But to do so, he holds that whenever
p is empirical, by “knowing p” we strictly mean “knowing that it is probable
that p”, which does not even entail the truth of p (Lewis, 1929, 324–325), and
he understands “it is probable that p” in a such a way that it can be entailed
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by one’s sense-data (Lewis, 1929, 331). Hence Lewis embraces a probability-
based Idealist reconstruction in order to rescue Dogmatism. Ayer (1936/1990,
19) in effect denies than anything other than tautologies is known: “Indeed, it
will be our contention that no proposition, other than a tautology, can possi-
bly be anything more than a probable hypothesis.” He embraces Probabilist
Scepticism.96
After the second world war, it was clear among analytic philosophers that
Classical Infallibilism leads to full-blown Idealism or Scepticism. In the light
of ordinary language philosophy and common sense philosophy, they found
these conclusions unacceptable.97 That is the context in which they finally re-
jected Classical Infallibilism. But there are four ways of doing so. One may
reject truth-entailment, discernibility or both; one may also maintain both but
allow that distinct properties play each role. All options have instances in post-
1950 epistemology.
The fall of Classical Infallibilism can tentatively be dated from Malcolm’s
(1952).98 The paper opens with Prichard’s claim that whether we know is dis-
cernible (sec. 3 above). Malcolm investigates it by contrasting five examples
of ordinary use of “know”. In the fourth and fifth, one claims that a river is
not dry on the grounds that one saw it flowing earlier that day. In the fourth
one’s claim is true; in the fifth it is not—the river dried up in the meanwhile.
Malcolm judges that we would say that one “knows” in the fourth but not
the fifth (Malcolm, 1952, 178–9). He stresses that nothing discernible differs
between the two cases and infers that one’s “grounds” are identical between
the two.99 Thus he takes “grounds” to be discernible but not truth-entailing.
He concludes that “strong” but non truth-entailing “grounds”, in conjunction
with truth, are sufficient for knowledge. In a somewhat prescient way, Mal-
colm finds “surprising” that truth alone could make the difference between
96See also Ayer (1940): in spite of its title, the book hardly mentions knowledge at all. Ayer
restates the view that any empirical belief has a merely fallible basis (39, 43). His answer to induc-
tive scepticism is that empirical beliefs can be based on “reasonable”, though not “demonstrative”,
inferences (see e.g. 230), not that they can constitute knowledge.
97Other factors have undoubtedly played a role, such as the internal difficulties of Idealist pro-
grammes. See e.g. Marion (2000b) on the demise of sense-data theories.
98It is hard for me to say what is Russell’s conception of knowledge in Human Knowledge and its
limits (1948). He puts forward the “true belief supported by adequate evidence” account with some
reticence (Russell, 1948, 170–1). The thrust of the book is that Humean scepticism is averted once
we recognise that there are grades of knowledge and that these grades are degrees of probability.
My best guess is that he has a view like that of C.I. Lewis’s in mind. But if it can be argued that his
view is that one knows that p provided that one believes p, p is true and made probable by one’s
evidence, then he may pre-date Malcolm in defending the Justified True Belief view.
99Malcolm (1952, 179): “Was there any way that you could have discovered by reflexion [sic], in
case (5), that you did not know ? It would have been useless to have reconsidered your grounds
for saying that there would be water, because in case (4), where you did know, your grounds were
identical. [. . . ] Prichard says that we can determine by reflexion whether we know something or
merely believe it. But where, in these cases, is the material that reflexion would strike upon ? There
is none.”
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knowing and not knowing:
As philosophers we may be surprised to observe that it can be that
the knowledge that p is true should differ from the belief that p is
true only in the respect that in one case p is true and in the other
false. But that is the fact. (Malcolm, 1952, 180)
He nevertheless sticks to the conclusion because he thinks that the only alterna-
tive is to require the discernibility of knowing, which entails an unacceptable
level of scepticism.100
Internalist Fallibilists maintain that knowledge requires a discernible prop-
erty, but deny that it must be truth-entailing. They take over the Probabilistic
Sceptics’ notion of discernible indication of truth and the idea that such an indica-
tion is enough to justify belief.101 But they add that in conjunction with truth, it
is also sufficient for knowledge. After Malcolm’s seminal paper, the view was
adopted by Chisholm (1956, 447 and 1957, 1, 16) and Ayer (1956, 34). That is
the familar Justified True Belief analysis. Its main flaw was quickly pointed out
by Gettier (1963). In some cases it is a coincidence that the two conditions are
satisfied; in such cases one does not know. The view was consequently all but
given up.102 Far from being a long-held conception, the Justified True Belief
analysis’s shelf-life was a mere eleven years.
The Gettier problem threatens any analysis of knowledge as a conjunction
of truth with a non-truth entailing condition. Its apparent lesson is that knowl-
edge requires a truth-entailing condition.103 Externalist Infallibilists took up the
suggestion. On their view knowledge requires a mark of truth, but not a dis-
cernible one. A Crude Causal account illustrates the idea.104 Say that a belief is
caused by the corresponding fact iff for some p, it is a belief that p and p caused it.
The Crude Causal account is that one knows just if one’s belief is caused by the
corresponding fact. Being caused by the corresponding fact is a mark of truth:
if p caused one’s belief that p then p is so. But it is not discernible: one could
be sufficiently attentive and mistakenly think that one’s belief is caused by the
corresponding fact while it is not. In the wake of the Gettier problem several
Externalist Infallibilist accounts appeared.105
100Malcolm (1952, 179). If the Legend was true, it would be strange for Malcolm to be surprised.
It is worth noting that Malcolm’s objection to scepticism is not merely that it is at odds with ordi-
nary use. For he adds: “We do not think of our usage as being loose or incorrect—and it is not.”
(Malcolm, 1952, 179, my emphasis). Thus he is just as much making the common sense objection
that we obviously know many things and that it is prima facie extremely implausible to deny it.
101See sec. 4.5 above on indications of truth and Probabilist Scepticism.
102See however Hetherington (1999) and Weatherson (2003) for a spirited defence.
103Sturgeon (1993), Zagzebski (1994), Merricks (1995). See Howard-Snyder et al. (2003) for an
opposite view.
104See Goldman (1967); Jenkins (2006) for refined views along those lines.
105Notably Goldman (1967); Unger (1968); Armstrong (1968); Dretske (1969); Nozick (1981). In
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Both views face a weakening question. If the Internalist’s discernible prop-
erty need not entail truth, would any discernible property do? If believing is
discernible, any belief has some discernible property. Thus the weakest Falli-
bilist Internalism identifies knowledge and true belief. In practice, Internalists
require more: a discernible property that somehow indicates truth. Their task
is to say what that involves and to motivate the requirement. For instance,
some Internalists require that truth be probable enough given one’s experience—
which they take to be discernible. Their task is to say how experience makes
something probable and to motivate the level of probability they require. Simi-
larly, if the Externalist’s truth-entailing property need not be discernible, would
any truth-entailing property do? The weakest truth-entailing property is truth.
Thus the weakest Infallibilist Externalism identifies knowledge and true belief.
In practice, Externalists require more: a property that somehow makes it non-
accidental that one believes the truth. Their task is to say what that involves
and to motivate the requirement. As the True Belief account is a natural end-
point in the rejection of Classical Infallibilism it is no surprise that it appeared
in the contemporary period.106
For a time the preferred strategy to answer the weakening question was to
confront candidate accounts to allegedly intuitive judgements about cases. A
more fruitful strategy is to ask what roles we except knowledge to play and
how they constrain acceptable weakenings. For instance, if we expect knowl-
edge to enter an explanation of how one’s actions may be guided by facts them-
selves, non-accidental true belief is arguably better suited to the task than true
belief.107
Insofar as several weakenings appear to play legitimate theoretical roles,
one will be tempted by pluralist or variantist views according to which “knowl-
edge” is ambiguous or context-sensitive. It is no surprise that such views have
flourished in recent times.108
A putative role of knowledge is to justify belief.109 Externalist views are
the current literature the prominent Externalist Infallibilist accounts are the safety (Sosa, 1993,
1999; Williamson, 2000; Pritchard, 2005) and virtue-theoretic accounts (Sosa, 2007; Greco, 2010),
as well as the combination of both (Pritchard, 2012). The virtue-theoretic account is more precisely
characterized as a Two-tiered Externalist Infallibilist account. See below.
106See Sartwell (1991).
107See Hyman (1999) for the role and Williamson (2000, 3.4) for the claim of explanatory superi-
ority.
108Malcolm (1952, 181) distinguished a “strong” and “weak” sense of “know”. Interestingly, he
upholds Classical Infallibilist standards for the strong sense (see notably Malcolm, 1952, 183–6).
See also Stine (1976), Lewis (1979, 1996), Unger (1986), Cohen (1988, 1999), Williams (1991), DeRose
(1992a, 2009), Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005), Fantl and McGrath (2009).
109In the Hellenistic debate is was assumed that knowledge, and only knowledge, would justify
assent. The Probabilist Sceptical idea that something less could justify belief (and not merely guide
action) was apparently not introduced before Philo. See sec. 4.5. Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) argues
against the idea that knowledge makes belief reasonable, but leaves open whether a belief can be
both justified an unreasonable.
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criticised for failing to secure it.110 The suggestion is that justified belief re-
quires some discernible indication of truth. Internalist Infallibilism takes knowl-
edge to require both a discernible indication and a mark of truth. On pains
of collapsing into Classical Infallibilism, the same property cannot play both
roles. But a straightforwardly conjunctive account is likely to face a secondary
Gettier problem: when it is a coincidence that one’s belief bears both a dis-
cernible indication and a mark of truth, one does not know.111 On better ver-
sions of the view the mark of truth, while not discernible itself, entails that one’s
belief bears a discernible indication of truth. Undefeated Justification accounts
illustrate the idea. One these accounts knowledge requires a “justification”,
which is taken to be a discernible indication of truth, and in addition that one’s
“justification” is “undefeated”, where the justification’s being “undefeated” is
not discernible but ensures that a belief is true.112 Thus undefeated justifica-
tion is a mark of truth that entails a discernible indication of truth without
being discernible itself. In the wake of the Gettier problem several Internalist
Infallibilist accounts appeared.113
As defined, Externalist and Internalist Infallibilisms are not exclusive. If
believing is discernible, for instance, and if it counts as a sufficient “indication
of truth”, then the two are coextensive. To specify a divide one needs a notion
of indication of truth. Internalists with respect to that notion are those who take
it to be discernible and entailed by knowing. Strict Externalists are those who
deny that it is required or that it is discernible. Since there is no uncontroversial
notion of indication of truth, there is no uncontroversial way of drawing the
divide.114
A potential source of difficulty for Internalists is that little, or nothing, is
discernible. (Externalists face no parallel difficulty, since there obviously are
truth-entailing properties.) Naïvely, one may think that many things are dis-
cernible. If there is an elephant in your room, then if you are attentive enough,
110BonJour (1980), Lehrer (1990, 162–163).
111The argument in Williamson (2000, 3.2) may be adapted, substituting a candidate discernible
condition for the internal one.
112See Howard-Snyder et al. (2003, 306) for the claim that most defeasibility conditions entail
truth.
113Lehrer (1965); Chisholm (1966); Sosa (1969); Klein (1971); Harman (1973); Pollock (1986, ap-
pendix), and most of the ’fourth-clause’ accounts discussed in Shope (1983). Goldman (1976) and
Lewis (1996) defend accounts according to which (roughly) one knows provided one’s experience
entails truth over a range of situations relevantly like one’s current situation. Even though these
accounts are not usually classified as “internalist”, they fall into the Internalist Infallibilist camp if
they take experience be discernible.
114Primitivists hold that knowledge is not definable. Since knowing is truth-entailing, they are
Classical Infallibilists if they think that knowing is discernible (Prichard, 1950), Externalist Infalli-
bilists otherwise (Williamson, 2000). Williamson is also a Strict Externalist on any way of drawing
the divide, since he claims that nothing is luminous, which we may take to imply that nothing is
discernible (see sec. 2).
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you will notice it.115 However, consideration of illusions, dreams and the like
shrink the domain of the discernible.116 Most Internalists retreat to the idea
that (some part of) one’s inner mental life is discernible. (Hence the label. On
the New Story, however, Internalists ascribe a central role to the internal be-
cause it is discernible, not because it is internal.) One reason for the idea’s
enduring popularity may be that mistakes about the inner are harder to imag-
ine and to observe. It is not easy to show that someone who believes they are
in pain are not. Careful experiment or indirect arguments are needed to show
that such mistakes are possible.117 Whether or not the idea is correct, once the
discernible base is limited to the inner, Internalists must either be generous on
what counts as a sufficient indication of truth or tolerate an extensive scepti-
cism. The dialectic is familiar from the contemporary literature.118
It is often said that “infallibilism” fosters scepticism. If “infallibilism” means
imposing truth-entailing conditions on knowledge, that is false. As the True
Belief and Crude Causal account illustrate, Infallibilism is compatible with ro-
bust Dogmatism. What fosters scepticism is imposing a condition that is both
truth-entailing and discernible. Even the requirement that “justification” entails
truth has no immediate sceptical consequences unless justification is assumed
to be discernible. When the requirement of discernible marks of truth is given
up, traditional sceptical arguments loose their bite. Accordingly, Scepticism
has all but disappeared from contemporary epistemology.119 By contrast, the
discernibility requirement raises sceptical worries on its own, since it is doubt-
ful that anything is discernible. The claim that nothing is discernible may foster
a new form of Internalist scepticism, but that has yet come to pass.
Fallibilist Externalism holds that knowledge requires a indication of truth
that is not discernible nor truth-entailing. Truth must be added as a separate
condition. Prima facie the view combines the worst of both worlds: being Fal-
libilist, it faces the Gettier problem, and being Externalist, it forfeits whatever
appeal discernible indications of truth have. Surprisingly, however, some ac-
counts have been popular despite being widely taken to have both features. Re-
115Compare Gibbons (2006).
116Compare Malcolm’s (1952, 185) attempt to defend the idea that that there is an ink-bottle in
front of him now is discernible.
117See Schwitzgebel (2008). Adapting Williamson’s (2000, chap. 4), one may also argue that for
any property P, there are borderline cases in which one is attentive enough and either one belief’s
has P and one fails to believe that it has or one’s belief lacks P and one believes that it has it.
118See e.g. Bergmann (2006).
119Significantly, contemporary defences of scepticism (Unger, 1975; Frances, 2005) appeal to
wholly new arguments. Unger’s central argument for scepticism is a normative one (drawing
on Kripke’s 2011 dogmatic paradox): if one knows, a dogmatic attitude is justified; no dogmatic
attitude is justified; hence one does not know. Frances targets second-order knowledge only and
appeals to the (highly debatable) principle that if some apparent expert believes p, no non-expert
knows p. He argues that if one knows that someone knows something, they know that that person
believes something, but some apparent experts believe that there are no beliefs, so no non-expert
knows that someone knows something.
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liabilism, Proper Function and Virtue-Theoretic accounts are cases in point.120
On closer examination, however, the accounts are Infallibilist.121 On their best
versions, they require a mark of truth that entails an indication of truth. By
contrast with Internalist Infallibilists, however, the indication of truth is not
supposed to be discernible. Call the view Two-tiered Externalist Infallibilism.
For instance, some Virtue-Theoretic accounts hold that knowledge consists in
a belief that is true because competently formed. Being truth because competently
formed entails truth, but is not discernible. It entails being competently formed,
which is a matter of one’s belief being the product of cognitive processes that
reliably yield truths. The latter is not discernible either, but it is taken to indicate
truth. The appeal of these accounts is to offer a substitute to the Internalist’s
discernible indication of truth that does not require discernibility. One the one
hand, it is easier to argue that they indicate truth; on the other hand, it has been
argued that they fail to justify belief. Again, the dialectic is familiar from the
contemporary literature.122
The demise of Classical Infallibilism in mainstream analytic epistemology
was impressively sudden and complete.123 The view may still linger on, how-
ever, as a theory of evidence. Post-Gettier epistemology has witnessed an in-
creased use of the notion of evidence as distinct from knowledge.124 Some epis-
temologists seem to implicitly think of evidence in Classical Infallibilist terms:
our evidence consists in discernible marks of truth or propositions for which
we have such marks. For instance, they may think that our evidence consists
in discernible aspects of our experience. If these philosophers dispense with
a notion of knowledge entirely, their view is essentially a notational variant of
Probabilist Scepticism, with “evidence” in lieu of “knowledge”. Most often,
they endorse a looser standard for knowledge; their view is a variant of Inter-
nalist Infallibilism. Note that the contemporary rise of the notion of evidence
is partly due to the Bayesian tradition. If, as I suspect, the tradition has roots
120See Goldman (1986, 2011) for Reliabilism, Plantinga (1993) for the Proper Function account
and Sosa (1991, 2007); Zagzebski (2000); Greco (2010) for Virtue-theoretic ones.
121Plantinga’s (1993, 17–9) original account was Fallibilist. In the face of Gettier problems (Greene
and Balmert, 1997), he adopted an Infallibilist version (1996, 328; 1997, 144). Goldman’s (1986, 47)
account includes a “local reliability” condition for which he refers to his Goldman (1976). The
condition is truth-entailing. Sosa (1991, 238) stresses that belief that is both true and (intellectually)
virtuous is not enough; in Sosa (2007, 23) he proposes that knowledge is belief that is true because
virtuous.
122See notably Goldman (1979); Lehrer and Cohen (1983); Cohen (1984); Sosa (1991).
123Almeder’s (1974) answer to the Gettier problem is a rare exception.
124The notion would require an history of its own. Up to Descartes “evidence” is almost exclu-
sively a name for the property of being “evident” (Buridan’s evidentia is now translated as “evi-
dentness”). In Locke the term is used likewise, but also for that which is evident. Moreover, he
takes that which is evident to make things certain or probable. He does not say that the former is
“evidence for” the latter, but that was a natural extension of his use which is found e.g. in Hume
(2007, sec. X). I submit that these authors take the evident to bear discernible marks of truth. They
may restrict the evident to what bears non-derivative discernible marks of truth, as opposed, e.g., to
what is known by deduction.
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in Classical Infallibilism, it is not surprising that its notion of evidence has a
Classical Infallibilist flavour.125
6 Conclusion
The New Story is simple but surprisingly powerful. It makes sense of a range
of features of the history of epistemology. Historical views are hard to place
on the contemporary map and conversely because the latter reject the former’s
conception of knowledge. Scepticism was influential in the past, but not now,
because past views lead to it and contemporary ones do not. Past philoso-
phers did not discuss the definition of knowledge because they did not dis-
agree about it. Idealism was predominant for a couple of centuries because it
was a desperate attempt to rescue Dogmatism within the bounds of Classical
Infallibilism. It disappeared almost entirely afterwards because it had lost its
purpose. The Gettier problem appeared in the mid-twentieth century because
views clearly subject to it did not exist before. Contemporary epistemology
divides into Externalism and Internalism because they are the two main ways
of giving up the traditional view. Contemporary epistemology has two central
notions, justification and knowledge, because each is felt to capture one side of
the traditional view: discernibility and truth-entailment. Internalist notions of
evidence gained popularity in the contemporary period because they offered
a new home for Classical Infallibilist intuitions. Needless to say, no remotely
comparable explanatory success can be adduced for the Legend.
Epistemologists may draw a few lessons from the New Story. First: we are
all Infallibilists now.126 Post-Gettier and Classical views alike put a substantial
truth-entailing condition on knowledge. What sets contemporary views apart
is not to require that the condition should be discernible.127 If it where, there
would be a non-trivial method that a sufficiently attentive subject could follow
to avoid error entirely. Contemporary views deny that there is one.128 Second:
the main divide now is whether knowledge additionally requires an indication of truth,
and if so, a discernible one. In particular, whether knowledge requires an indi-
cation of truth that correlates with some normative standard—“justified” or
125See in particular Jeffrey (1965; 1992), whose epistemological project is to strip the Bayesian
conception of evidence of its infallibilist roots.
126See Sturgeon (1993).
127Contrast with Cohen (1988) and Reed (2002a) who characterize “fallibilism” as the view that
some beliefs with non-truth-entailing evidence (Cohen) or with non-knowledge-entailing justifi-
cation (Reed) constitute knowledge. They suggest that “infallibilism” has sceptical implications,
but that is so only if evidence and justification are constrained in certain ways. If one’s evidence
is everything one knows, and if the only justification for believing p is that you know that p, “in-
fallibilism” in Cohen or Reed’s sense has no sceptical implications. By contrast, if evidence and
justification are required to be discernible, “infallibilism” in both senses leads to Scepticism.
128See Williamson (2008). A method is non-trivial if it allows some beliefs.
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“reasonable” belief. Strict Externalists deny it; Two-Tiered Externalists require it;
Internalists require it to be discernible. Third: contemporary epistemology is revi-
sionist. That does not mean that we have shifted topic: we talk about the same
thing as tradition did, though we disagree sharply over what it involves.129
But that means that contemporary epistemology goes against a deep-seated
tendency in philosophical—and perhaps ordinary, see below—thought about
knowledge. Thus contemporary epistemologists have reason to treat their own
unreflective judgements with care. For instance, we have seen that Classical In-
fallibilist intuitions may be unwittingly at work in the way some philosophers
think of justification or evidence.
I have little doubt that the Justified True Belief analysis will keep on be-
ing used as a starting point in epistemology courses for a long while—being
loosely motivated instead of called “traditional”, or worse, being simply called
an analysis that was “thought to be traditional”. That is regrettable because
that prevents adressing Classical Infallibilist intuitions head on and puts in
play an unexamined notion of “justification” that attracts discernibility intu-
itions. Students are then in a bad position to integrate past and contemporary
epistemology, to make sense of sceptical arguments and to see the relevant di-
vides of the contemporary scene. Be that as it may, if somebody wished to
update their lectures in light of the New Story, what should they do? One
suggestion is to start with the conflict between the obvious fact that we know
many things and appealing lines of thought that lead to the conclusion that
we do not.130 Classical Infallibilism may be blamed for the conflict and the
Justified True Belief introduced as an attempted solution. One can then pro-
ceed as usual. Another, more radical one, is to postpone questions of defini-
tions entirely and focus instead on the roles knowledge is meant to play. One
can then examine whether discernibility and truth-entailment requirements
emerge from those and let the Classical Infallibilist and Justified True Belief
pictures emerge.
There are many gaps in the New Story. These are promising areas of further
study. The present discussion focused on a small sample of Western philoso-
phers and on non-inferential knowledge. Many periods and authors are yet to
be discussed. Inferential knowledge is particularly troublesome for Classical
Infallibilism; it is worth examining whether philosophers faced the predicted
trouble. Some events remain to be explained: why Scepticism became influ-
ential again the Modern period, why Idealism was not attractive before the
Modern period, why Classical Infallibilism did not collapse before the mid-
twentieth century. We should also investigate how views on knowledge inter-
129Contrast Pasnau (2013).
130Compare the opening pages of Lewis (1996).
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acted with views on necessity, belief and content, all of which appear in the
Classical Infallibilist’s definition of knowledge. The role of Classical Infallibil-
ism in broader epistemology should also be explored: how it impacted concep-
tions of inquiry, science and norms of belief. The history of the influential idea
of indication of truth is also worth studying in detail.
One question the New Story obviously raises is: why was Classical Infal-
libilism so widely and strongly held? A scholarly hypothesis would be that
Classical Infallibilism was somehow transmitted through the Western philo-
sophical tradition. Several may be explored.131 A folk hypothesis would be
that Classical Infallibilism is somehow rooted in the ways (Western) people
ascribe knowledge. Since its recent demise in analytic circles is unlikely to
have had any influence on non-philosophers, we should be able to observe
these roots now. Hence psychology can be brought to bear on the New Story.
Since ordinary people are not sceptics, they are not straightforwardly apply-
ing an implicit Classical Infallibilist theory of knowledge. But they do tend
to deny knowledge in the light of indiscernible possibilities of error.132 What-
ever mechanisms are responsible for that tendency may have contributed to
the long-lasting appeal of Classical Infallibilism.133 Needless to say, scholarly
and folk hypotheses may be combined.
The interaction between history and psychology goes both ways. The Leg-
end has been taken as prima facie evidence that the folk conception of knowl-
edge is justified true belief.134 That has lead to a focus on knowledge attribu-
tions in Gettier-style cases.135 The New Story casts doubt on that evidence and
suggests focusing on ascriptions in sceptical scenarios.
Another question is whether Classical Infallibilism is a specifically West-
ern phenomenon. There is some indication that it is not. For instance, there is
131One is transmission of the positive Hellenistic conception. However, even though Hellenis-
tic epistemology filtered into neo-Platonism and medieval Aristotelianism, its wider impact re-
mains to be established. Another is transmission on the authority of sceptical arguments: by trade,
philosophers are taught to take sceptical arguments seriously, and so they endorse conceptions
of knowledge that make these arguments serious. That hypothesis reverses the natural order of
explanation. Another is that Classical Infallibilism was primed by some widely-read texts, such as
Plato’s Republic. Or course a combination of such factors is possible.
132See Nagel et al.’s (2013) Sceptical Pressure case. In the control story, Emma believes that a piece
of jewellery displayed in a shop is a diamond necklace. In the sceptical pressure variant, it is added
that “Emma could not tell the difference between a real diamond and a cubic zirconium fake just
by looking or touching”. The addition drops the number of subjects who ascribe knowledge (in a
forced-choice paradigm) from 75% to 41%. See also Nichols et al. (2003).
133One simple suggestion is that people are applying a Classical Infallibilist conception but with
only a salient sample of error possibilities in mind. However I doubt that knowledge ascription
goes merely by way of applying some implicit theory. For all we know it could involve a mix of
heuristics, comparison to paradigm cases, and bits of theory.
134See e.g. Starmans and Friedman (2012, 663).
135Recent studies suggest that the ordinary conception is not justified true belief (Machery et al.,
2015).
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evidence of it in classical Indian philosophy.136 Tantalizingly, there is even evi-
dence that its rejection there antedates the Western one by half a millennium.137
The leads are worth pursuing.
136See Phillips (2015, sec. 1.1 and 3). Briefly put: classical Indian philosophers shared the
view that knowledge is thought (“cognition”, but in a non-truth-entailing sense) generated by
a “knowledge-source” (prama¯na. ), where the latter is truth-entailing. A central debate was whether
and how prama¯na. -generated thoughts are “certified” to be such. On one possible reading, they
tacitly assumed that being prama¯na. -generated had to be discernible in order to yield knowledge,
and the debate was about whether and how it was discernible. Note that the Classical Infallibilist
reading of early Indian epistemology is incompatible with the presentation given by Stoltz (2007,
401–6). Stoltz stresses that Indian philosophers took knowledge to be a factive mental state and
endorsed something like a causal theory of knowledge. So far that is consistent with the Classical
Infallibilist’s truth-entailment requirement. But he adds that on their view knowledge is not lumi-
nous and knowing can be phenomenally like being mistaken (405–6). These claims are incompat-
ible with the Classical Infallibilist’s requirement of a discernible truth-entailing property. However
Stoltz appears to ascribe them to classical Indian philosophers only because they take knowledge
to be a mental state and they endorse a causal theory. But we have seen that Descartes endorses
the discernibility requirement even though he takes clear and distinct perception to be a factive
mental states and we have seen that Stoics endorse a discernibility requirement even though they
have a causal theory of cognitive impression. Hence the fact that classical Indian philosophers
took knowledge to be a factive mental state is not enough to conclude that there are externalists
and to rule out a Classical Infallibilist reading.
137One on possible reading, Gan˙ges´a—c. 1325 CE, founder of the new era of the “Logic” (Nya¯ya)
school—denies that the discernibility of being prama¯na. -generated is necessary for knowledge. See
Phillips (2004, 11) on Gan˙ges´a’s “fallibilism”. Careful examination is needed, however. Phillips
(2004, 10) calls Gan˙ges´a’s epistemology “externalist” because he does not take knowledge to re-
quire that one is aware or knows that one’s thought is prama¯na. -generated. But that does not make a
view externalist in the modern sense, for it is compatible with the requirement that being prama¯na. -
generated is discernible (sec. 3). Moreover, Gan˙ges´a grants that there are “signs” of whether a
thought is prama¯na. -generated (Phillips, 2004, 11–2). If he takes those to be present just when a
thought is prama¯na. -generated, and if being sufficiently attentive is enough to be aware of them,
then he is endorsing discernibility after all.
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